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The Minimal Dominant Set is a Non-Empty Core-Extension

Kóczy, László Á.; Lauwers, Luc - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

. The minimal (for inclusion) dominant set is non-empty and for a game with a non-empty coalition structure core, the … minimal dominant set returns this core. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385367

Contributing or Free-Riding? A Theory of Endogenous Lobby Formation

Konishi, Hideo; Furusawa, Taiji - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2008

"intuitive" hybrid solution concept, the free-riding-proof core, which is always nonempty but does not necessarily achieve global …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004990061

The Maximal Payoff and Coalition Formation in Coalitional Games

Zhao, Jingang - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2008

This paper first establishes a new core theorem using the concept of generated payoffs: the TU (transferable utility …) core is empty if and only if the maximum of generated payoffs (mgp) is greater than the grand coalition’s payoff v(N), or …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423160

The ?-Core and Coalition Formation

Chander, Parkash - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2003

This paper reinterprets the ? -core (Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997)) and justifies it as well as its prediction that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423240

The Evolution of Core Stability in Decentralized Matching Markets

Nax, Heinrich H.; Pradelski, Bary S. R.; Young, H. Peyton - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2013

sell-side). This simple and intuitive learning process implements core allocations even though agents have no knowledge of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010665513

Size Monotonicity and Stability of the Core in Hedonic Games

Dimitrov, Dinko; Sung, Shao Chin - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2011

We show that the core of each strongly size monotonic hedonic game is not empty and is externally stable. This is in … sharp contrast to other sufficient conditions for core non-emptiness which do not even guarantee the existence of a stable …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009189885

Core-stable Rings in Second Price Auctions with Common Values

Forges, Françoise; Orzach, Ram - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010

In a common value auction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core … form, in spite of the underlying strategic externalities. A ring is core-stable if the core of this characteristic function …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008674341

The Formation of Networks with Transfers among Players

Jackson, Matthew O.; Bloch, Francis - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2004

We examine the formation of networks among a set of players whose payoffs depend on the structure of the network. We focus on games where players may bargain by promising or demanding transfer payments when forming links. We examine several variations of the transfer/bargaining aspect of link...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005392531

Coalition Formation in Generalized Apex Games

Karos, Dominik - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2012

existence of core stable partitions are stated and core stable partitions are characterized. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010904935

Coalition Formation in Simple Games: The Semistrict Core

Dimitrov, Dinko; Haake, Claus-Jochen - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2006

core of the game is nonempty. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005385389