To investigate the size and the timing of the direct impact of participatory arrangements onbusiness performance, we assemble and analyze extraordinary daily data – for rejection,production and downtime rates for all operators in a single plant during a 35 month period,more than 77,000...

Market imperfections may cause firms and workers to under-invest in specific training. Thispaper shows that profit sharing may be a suitable instrument to enhance specific traininginvestments, either by enhancing wage flexibility or by increasing the returns to training...

Based on a German representative sample of employees we explore the relevance anddevelopment of further training in private sector firms. We focus on formal training andexplore possible individual and job-based determinants of its incidence. We also showchanges over time during a 20 year...

Implementing performance pay requires that workers' output be measured. Whenmeasurement costs differ among firms, those with a measurement cost advantage choose toimplement performance pay. They attract the best workers, and both the level and variabilityof compensation are higher at these firms...

In this paper we document the wage structure and labor mobility in the Netherlands in theperiod 1999-2003. We explain the importance of wage-setting institutions in the Netherlandsand the main actors. The analyses are based on administrative sources allowing forcomparisons between and within...

This paper provides a systematic empirical investigation of the effect of product marketliberalization on employment when there are interactions between policies and institutions inproduct and labor markets...

Teamwork and cooperation between workers can be of substantial value to a firm, yet thelevel of worker cooperation often varies between individual firms. We show that thesedifferences can be the result of labor market competition if workers have heterogeneouspreferences and preferences are...

A large, mature and robust economic literature on pay for performance now exists, whichprovides a useful framework for thinking about pay for performance systems. I use thelessons of the literature to discuss how to design and implement pay for performance inpractice....

In this paper we show that subtle forms of deceit undermine the effectiveness of incentives.We design an experiment in which the principal has an interest in underreporting the trueperformance difference between the agents in a dynamic tournament...