We consider a capital accumulation game between two different jurisdictions. When the jurisdictions adopt open loop strategies, we study the inefficiency of the steady state Nash equilibrium with respect to the steady state utilitarian solution.

Most of the literature on unemployment benefits assumes that they are detrimental to the search effort. However, search is costly and the unemployment are largely finance-constrained. We here consider that search intensity depends on the financial spendings of the worker.

I apply three noncooperative models of coalition formation to a Cournot olygopoly. In each model, each firm has to choose the coalition it wants to belong to. But each of those models is characterised by a different assumption that defines what happens to a coalition from which one or more...

In this work, a new axiomatization of the Shapley value is presented. An associated game is constructed which can also be interpreted as a perturbation of the original game. We define a sequence of games, when the term of order n, in this sequence, is the associated game of the term of order (n-1).