Over the past two decades, many countries have passed legislation giving more independence to their central banks. This institutional evolution has concerned several developed countries but also developing countries and, is consistent with the Barro and Gordon's theory of time-inconsistent...

Over the last decade, a growing number of emerging countries has adopted inflation targeting as monetary policy framework. In a recent paper, Freedman and Laxton (2009) ask the question “Why Inflation Targeting?”. This paper empirically investigates this question by analyzing a large set of...

This study examines public opinion in 15 European countries, on the proposal to establish an independent European Central Bank (ECB). Using data from Euro- barometer surveys for 1998 to 2000, which included a speci c question on this issue, we show that in ation performance is not su cient to...

In this paper, we study the inflation dynamics in an industrial inflation-targeting country (New Zealand). Our objective is to check if the inflation targeting policy has a transition period or not. Loosely speaking, we try to give some response to the famous debate: if the inflation targeting...

In this contribution, we investigate the effects of observation-only and observation with feedback from a third-party, in a one-shot dictator game (DG). In addition to a baseline condition (DG), a third-party anonymous subject is introduced who either silently observes or observes and gives...

This paper provides a game-theoretical analysis of the use by athletes of performance-enhancing drugs. We focus on a two-player game where players are heterogeneous and performances are subject to uncertainty. While the standard setup assumes these drugs increase maximum performances, we assume...

This paper uses experimental data to examine the existence of a teaching strategy among bounded rational players. If players realize that their own actions modify their opponent's beliefs and actions, they might play certain actions to this specific end ; and forego immediate payoffs if the...

This paper proposes an equilibrium approach to deception where deception is defined to be the process by which actions are chosen to induce erroneous inferences so as to take advantage of them. Specifically, we introduce a framework with boundedly rational players in which agents make inferences...

This notes reports part of a larger study of "petty corruption" by government bureaucrats in the process of approving new business projects. Each bureaucrat may demand a bribe as a condition for approval. Entrepreneurs use the services of an intermediary who, for a fee, undertakes to obtain all...

A game with precedence constraints is a TU game with restricted cooperation, where the set of feasible coalitions is a distributive lattice, hence generated by a partial order on the set of players. Its core may be unbounded, and the bounded core, which is the union of all bounded faces of the...