Similar Search Results

To vote or to abstain? An experimental study or first past the poste and PR elections

Blais, André; Pilet, Jean-Benoît; Straeten, Karine Van Der - HAL - 2011

We examine through an experimental design how rational and non-rational considerations affect the decision to vote or to abstain in First Past the Post and PR elections. We show that in both types of elections, but particularly so under PR, a majority of subjects do not make the "right"...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009295309

Who's Favored by Evaluative Voting? An Experiment Conducted During the 2012 French Presidential Election

Baujard, Antoinette; Gavrel, Frédéric; Igersheim, Herrade - HAL - 2013

Under evaluative voting, the voter freely grades each candidate on a numerical scale, with the winning candidate being … determined by the sum of the grades they receive. This paper compares evaluative voting with the two-round system, reporting on … evaluative voting rules, and the specific pattern of strategic voting under the official, two-round voting rule. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011026210

Committee decisions: Optimality and Equilibrium

Laslier, Jean-François; Weibull, Jörgen - HAL - 2008

different values to the two types of mistake that may occur. Most voting rules have a plethora of uninformative equilibria, and … informative voting may be incompatible with equilibrium. We analyze an anonymous randomized majority rule that has a unique … under certain perturbations of the behavioral assumptions: (i) a slight preference for voting according to one's conviction …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008793596

Judge:Don't Vote!

Balinski, Michel; Laraki, Rida - HAL - 2010

This article explains why the traditional model of the theory of social choice misrepresents reality, it cannot lead to acceptable methods of ranking and electing in any case, and a more realistic model leads inevitably to one method of ranking and electing—majority judgment—that best meets...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008793943

National Politics and International Agreements

Kempf, Hubert; Rossignol, Stéphane - HAL - 2010

International agreements about transnational issues are difficult to reach, as the examples of the Copenhagen summit or the never-ending discussions of the future of the European Union make clear. In this paper, we relate this difficulty to the political process and the conflicts of interest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010603649

Experimental comparison of compulsory and non compulsory arbitration mechanisms

Guerci, Eric; Thoron, Sylvie - HAL - 2011

We run a series of experiments to compare the well known arbitration scheme FOA (Final Offer Arbitration) with a new …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008924979

Lies and Biased Evaluation: A Real-Effort Experiment

Rosaz, Julie; Villeval, Marie-Claire - HAL - 2012

This paper presents the results of a laboratory experiment in which workers perform a real-effort task and supervisors report the workers' performance to the experimenter. The report is non veriﬁable and determines the earnings of both the supervisor and the worker. We ﬁnd that not all the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009278326

An experimental investigation of imprecision attitude and its relation with risk attitude and impatience

Cohen, Michèle; Tallon, Jean-Marc; Vergnaud, … - HAL - 2009

We report in this paper the result of three experiments on risk, ambiguity and time attitude. The first two differed by …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010738616

Tax Evasion, Welfare Fraud, and "The Broken Windows" Effect: An Experiment in Belgium, France and the Netherlands

Lefebvre, Mathieu; Pestieau, Pierre; Riedl, Arno; … - HAL - 2011

In a series of experiments conducted in Belgium (Wallonia and Flanders), France and the Netherlands, we compare …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010750992

Cooperation in a Game of Chicken with Heterogeneous Agents: An Experimental Study

Cabon-Dhersin, Marie-Laure; Etchart-Vincent, Nathalie - HAL - 2008

Using a two-stage Game of Chicken, Cabon-Dhersin and Ramani (2007) examine the impact of population heterogeneity on cooperative behaviour. For that purpose, they introduce two different types of agents, namely those who always cooperate and those who strategically cooperate. The aim of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010751040