The concept of sea-river shipping is simple: a single vessel sails both coastal and inland waters. Thus, seaport transhipment is avoided resulting in lower transport costs. However, this concept is limited to certain transport waterways. On the Rhône-Saône corridor, sea-river shipping can...

The paper investigates competition in price schedules among vertically differentiated producers. First order price discrimination leading to personalized prices are the perfect equilibrium of the two-stage game where firms choose at the first stage to commit or not to a uniform price and compete...

This paper proposes a dynamic model of duopolistic competition under behaviorbased price discrimination with the following property: in equilibrium, a firm may reward its previous customers although long term contracts are not enforceable. A firm can offer a lower price to its previous customers...

The paper analyzes the interplay between technology diffusion and patent law. We develop a dynamic model where initial adoptions generate learning spillovers that reduce the cost of subsequent adoptions. In this setting, we contrast technology diffusion paths under competitive supply, subsidized...

This letter addresses the second-degree price discrimination issue when a mo- nopolized product is tied with environmental quality. The monopolist may degrade environmental quality too much when marginal valuations of environmental quality and the good itself are positively related across consumers.

This paper addresses the two-way implication between punctuality level of public transport and commuter behavior. We consider a modal competition between public transport and an alternative mode. Commuters may choose different strategies to minimize their journey cost. In particular, when the...

The paper examines under what conditions vertically differentiated duopolists engage in first-degree price discrimination. Each firm decides on a pricing regime at a first stage and sets prices at a second stage. The paper shows that when unit cost is an increasing and convex function of...

This note further characterizes the tacit collusion equilibria in the investment timing game of Boyer, Lasserre and Moreaux [1]. Tacit collusion equilibria may or may not exist, and when they do may involve either finite time investments (type 1) or infinite delay (type 2). The relationship...

This paper addresses the two-way implication between punctuality level of public transport and commuter behavior. We consider a modal competition between public transport and an alternative mode. Commuters may choose different strategies to minimize their journey cost. In particular, when the...