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Redesigning Teams and Incentives:A Real Effort Experiment with Managers of a Merged Company
Montmarquette, Claude; Rullière, Jean-Louis; Villeval, … - HAL - 2002
managers originating from different incentives and working habits. In this paper, we offer a new way to investigate in post … managers within a large pharmaceutical company show that not only changes in compensation incentives affect performance but … also that both managers' past compensation schemes and company cultures matter for cooperation. The efficiency of a new …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008788808
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Reining in Excessive Risk Taking by Executives : Experimental Evidence
Lefebvre, Mathieu; Vieider, Ferdinand - HAL - 2010
Compensation of executives by means of equity has long been seen as a means to tie executives' income to company performance, and thus as a solution to the principal-agent dilemma created by the separation of ownership and management in publicly owned companies. The overwhelming part of such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008790773
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Self-selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments
Eriksson, Tor; Teyssier, Sabrina; Villeval, Marie Claire - HAL - 2009
The literature has shown that the overall efficiency of exogenously imposed tournaments is reduced by a high variance in performance. This paper reports results from an experiment analyzing whether allowing subjects to self-select into different payment schemes is reducing the variability of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009401083
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Optimal Group Incentives with Social Preferences and Self-Selection
Teyssier, Sabrina - HAL - 2007
In this paper, we analyze group incentives when a proportion of agents feel in- equity aversion as defined by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). We define a separating equilibrium that explains the co-existence of multiple payment schemes in firms. We show that a tournament provides strong incentives to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008788937
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Experimental Evidence on Inequity Aversion and Self-Selection between Incentive Contracts
Teyssier, Sabrina - HAL - 2008
This paper reports on the results of an experiment testing whether the agents selfselect between a competitive payment scheme and a revenue-sharing scheme depending on their inequity aversion. Average efficiency should be increased when these payment schemes are endogenously chosen by agents. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008788967
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Other-Regarding Preferences and Performance Pay – An Experiment on Incentives and Sorting
Eriksson, Tor; Villeval, Marie-Claire - HAL - 2004
Variable pay not only creates a link between pay and performance but may also help firms in attracting the more productive employees (Lazear 1986, 2000). However, due to lack of natural data, empirical analyses of the relative importance of the selection and incentive effects of pay schemes are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008788998
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Self-Selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments
Eriksson, Tor; Teyssier, Sabrina; Villeval, Marie-Claire - HAL - 2006
When exogenously imposed, rank-order tournaments have incentive properties but their overall efficiency is reduced by a high variance in performance (Bull, Schotter, and Weigelt 1987). However, since the efficiency of performance-related pay is attributable both to its incentive effect and to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008790614
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Performance Pay, Sorting and Social Motivation
Eriksson, Tor; Villeval, Marie Claire - HAL - 2008
Variable pay links pay and performance but may also help firms in attracting more productive employees. Our experiment investigates the impact of performance pay on both incentives and sorting and analyzes the influence of repeated interactions between firms and employees on these effects. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008790841
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Feedback and Incentives : Experimental Evidence
Eriksson, Tor; Poulsen, Anders; Villeval, Marie-Claire - HAL - 2008
This paper experimentally investigates the impact of different pay and relative performance information policies on employee effort. We explore three information policies: No feedback about relative performance, feedback given halfway through the production period, and continuously updated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008791004
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Other-Regarding Preferences and Performance Pay - An Experiment on Incentives and Sorting
Eriksson, Tor; Villeval, Marie-Claire - HAL - 2004
Variable pay not only creates a link between pay and performance but may also help firms in attracting the more productive employees (Lazear 1986, 2000). However, due to lack of natural data, empirical analyses of the relative importance of the selection and incentive effects of pay schemes are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008791578