This paper investigates why firms choose to undertake product expansion through alliances with competitors rather than on their own.

In this study we re-examine the pricing of equity and the risk incentives of shareholders in levered firms. We derive a down-and-out call equity valuation model which rests on the assumption that shareholders choose the optimal investment and asset returns' volatility as a function of current...

The investment procedure prescribes the stages and tests through which all investment projects must pass before being accepted or not. It governs the conditions of acceptability and constitutes a powerful device of a priori control. In this paper, we intend to understand how investment...

We consider the provision of venture capital in a dynamic model with multiple research stages, where time and investment needed to meet each benchmark are unknown. The allocation of funds is subject moral hazard. The optimal contract provides for incentive payments linked to attaining the next...

In this paper, the authors show that a cross-listing allows a firm to make better investment decisions because it enhances stock price informativeness.

Dans la mesure où il existe une certaine ambiguïté dans la définition de plusieurs concepts relevant de ce que nous appelons l’information non conforme à la loi et aux normes, cet article propose une synthèse générale, fondée sur la théorie de l’agence et établie à partir des...

This article investigates the determinants of boards’ financial expertise using a sample of 95 non-financial French listed firms.

Care of the self, a technique for governing the individual in society, proves to be equally a control technique for the individual in the firm. In a firm dedicated to the cult of beauty, there is a blurring of the lines between employee and consumer individual. This blurring makes care of the...

This paper studies corporate control in a general equilibrium model with incomplete markets. At the market equilibrium, shareholders typically disagree on the way to evaluate production plans outside the market span. Hence a collective decision mechanism is needed to resolve this conflict. A...

An economy with two dates is considered, on state at the first date and a finite number of states at the last date. Shareholders determine production plans b voting -one share, one vote- and at r-majority stable equilibria, alternative production plans are supported by at most rx100 percent of...