Judgment (or logical) aggregation theory is logically more powerful than social choice theory and has been put to use to recover some classic results of this field. Whether it could also enrich it with genuinely new results is still controversial. To support a positive answer, the authors prove...

Indeterminate preferences have long been a tricky subject for choice theory. One reason for which preferences may be less than fully determinate is the lack of confidence in one’s preferences. In this paper, a representation of confidence in preferences is proposed. It is used to develop an...

Subjective assessment of an activity perception through an ergonomic approach.

Author's abstract. Judgment aggregation theory generalizes social choice theory by having the aggregation rule bear on judgments of all kinds instead of barely judgments of preference. The paper briefly sums it up, privileging the variant that formalizes judgment by a logical syntax. The theory...

Author's abstract. Approval voting has attracted considerable interest among voting theorists, but they have rarely investigated it in the Arrovian frame-work of social welfare functions (SWF) and never connected it with Arrow’s impossibility theorem. This note explores these two direc- tions....

This paper studies corporate control in a general equilibrium model with incomplete markets. At the market equilibrium, shareholders typically disagree on the way to evaluate production plans outside the market span. Hence a collective decision mechanism is needed to resolve this conflict. A...

An economy with two dates is considered, on state at the first date and a finite number of states at the last date. Shareholders determine production plans b voting -one share, one vote- and at r-majority stable equilibria, alternative production plans are supported by at most rx100 percent of...

This article provides a study of corporate control in a general equilibrium framework for production economies. When markets are incomplete, trading assets does not allow agents to fully resolve their conflict of interest: at the market equilibrium, shareholders disagree on the way to evaluate...

In absence of markets for externalities, the authors look for governances and conditions under which majority voting among shareholders is likely to give rise to efficient internalization. The central and natural role played by a governance of stakeholders is underlined and benchmarked.