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Transparency: From Enlightenment to Neoliberalism or When a Norm of Liberation Becomes a Tool of Governing

Mehrpouya, Afshin; Djelic, Marie-Laure - HEC Paris (École des Hautes Études Commerciales) - 2014

Transparency is one of the fundamental norms that structure our contemporary individual, organizational and social … authors undertake a conceptual genealogy of the powerful notion of transparency. Starting with its Enlightenment roots, they … explore the multiple competing and conflicting mobilizations of the notion of transparency through time to liberate, to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011147683

Do countries falsify economic date strategically? Some evidence that they do

Michalski, Tomasz; Stoltz, Gilles - HEC Paris (École des Hautes Études Commerciales) - 2010

The authors find evidence supporting the hypothesis that countries at times misreport their eco-nomic data in a strategic manner. Among those suspected are countries with xed exchange rate regimes, high negative net foreign asset positions or negative current account balances, which corroborates...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008672466

Unpacking the Principle of Openness in EU Law: Transparency, Participation and Democracy

Alemanno, Alberto - HEC Paris (École des Hautes Études Commerciales) - 2013

law. After addressing the semantic confusion existing between openness and transparency, it attempts – through a textual …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010705512

Insiders-outsiders, transparency and the value of the ticker

Foucault, Thierry; Cespa, Giovanni - HEC Paris (École des Hautes Études Commerciales) - 2008

In this paper, the authors consider a multi-period rational expectations model in which risk-averse investors differ in their information on past transaction prices (the ticker). Some investors (insiders) observe prices in real-time whereas other investors (outsiders) observe prices with a delay.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005011529

Does anonymity matter in electronic limit order markets ?

Thierry, FOUCAULT; Sophie, MOINAS; Erik, THEISSEN - HEC Paris (École des Hautes Études Commerciales) - 2003

We analyze the effect of concealing limit order traders’ identities on market liquidity. We develop a model in which limit order traders have asymmetric information on the cost of limit order trading (which is determined by the exposure to informed trading). A thin limit order book signals to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005011558

Interest alignment and firm performance

Gottschalg, Oliver; Meier, Degenhard - HEC Paris (École des Hautes Études Commerciales) - 2005

This study derives testable hypotheses from their framework and thus provides an empirical test of interest alignment theory based on a sample of 69 management buyouts in the UK. The results of the multivariate regression model suggest that in this setting, interest alignment does have a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005011520

Performance des Grands Groupes et Stratégies de rétribution des dirigeants

TREPO, Georges; ROUSSEL, Patrice - HEC Paris (École des Hautes Études Commerciales) - 1999

In today's managerial world (corporate governance, shareholders' wealth maximization, agency theory) how are CEOs paid in the 700 layest French firms ? What are the various components of total compensation: fixed camp, bonus fringes, stock options ? What parties influence the mix and amounts :...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005057414

CEO compensation strategies: consequences on the structure and Management of Executive Pay

TREPO, Georges; EL AKREMI, Assaad; ROUSSEL, Patrice - HEC Paris (École des Hautes Études Commerciales) - 2001

The aim of this research is to study compensation strategies for Chief Executive Officers (CEO) from various economic, political and symbolic perspectives. A theoretical model was developed to study the hypothetical influence of several phenomena suggested by theoretical work on executive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005021598