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MAULEON, Ana; VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent J. - Institut de Recherche Économique et Sociale (IRES), … - 2001

inefficient. Moreover, as the bargaining period becomes short or as the players become very patient, the unique outcome is always …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004985085

On Dominance in Wage Bargaining with Incomplete Information in an Unionized Cournot Oligopoly

Vannetelbosch, Vincent J. - Institut de Recherche Économique et Sociale (IRES), … - 1995

to compare the outcome of collective bargaining under two different bargaining structures- one in which a single wage is … bargained at the industry-level and one in which the wages are bargained at the firm-level. The bargaining process is described … by Rubinstein’s alternating-offer bargaining model with two-sided incomplete information about the bargainers’ discount …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004985130

Dominance and Equilibrium in Two-Person Alternating-Offer Bargaining with an Endogenous Deadline

Vannetelbosch, Vincent J. - Institut de Recherche Économique et Sociale (IRES), … - 1995

We study an alternating-offer bargaining game with a deadline from which the size of the cake decays. We consider both … equilibria). Then, we endogenize the choice of the deadline and we find that bargaining game is characterized by a deadline …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004985237

Bargaining with Externalities: Licensing of an Innovation

Sempere-Monerris, José J.; Vannetelbosch, Vincent J. - Institut de Recherche Économique et Sociale (IRES), … - 1997

The objective of this paper is to analyze the relationship between bargaining organizational forms and the licensing of …. Trading mechanisms based on bargaining models with voluntary matching become more relevant when the market for an innovation … simultaneous bids mechanism. Also, bargaining mechanisms allow the patentee to overcome the credibility problem associated with the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004985318

On Rationalizability in Two-Person Alternating-Offer Bargaining

Vannetelbosch, Vincent J. - Institut de Recherche Économique et Sociale (IRES), … - 1996

This paper reconsiders Rubinstein's alternating-offer bargaining game with complete information. We define …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004985349

Voluntary Pooled Public Knowledge Goods and Coalition Formation

DEDEURWAERDERE, Tom; GHIDI, Paolo MELINDI - Institut de Recherche Économique et Sociale (IRES), … - 2013

In this paper we develop a theoretical model of the mechanisms behind the voluntary provision of public knowledge goods in coalitions in presence of social preferences. The model builds on the large empirical literature on voluntary production of pooled public knowledge goods, such as source...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010691321

Generalized time-invariant overtaking

Geir B, ASHEIM; Claude, D’ASPREMONT; Kuntal, BANERJEE - Institut de Recherche Économique et Sociale (IRES), … - 2008

We present a new version of the overtaking criterion, which we call generalized time-invariant overtaking. The generalized time-invariant overtaking criterion (on the space of infinite utility streams) is defined by extending proliferating sequences of complete and transitive binary relations...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004984712

Generalized time-invariant overtaking

Geir B. , ASHEIM; Claude, DASPREMONT; Kuntal, BANERJEE - Institut de Recherche Économique et Sociale (IRES), … - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004984797

A fair solution to the compensation problem

Giacomo, VALETTA - Institut de Recherche Économique et Sociale (IRES), … - 2007

We study equity in economies where agents are endowed with different, non-transferable, personal talents. To compensate them for such differences a given amount of money needs to be shared among them. We axiomatize a family of social orderings over allocations based on efficiency, fairness and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004984888

Voting Power in a Sequence of Cooperative Games: The Case of EU Procedures

Laruelle, Annick; Widgren, Mika - Institut de Recherche Économique et Sociale (IRES), … - 1998

Probabilistic measures of a priori voting power are useful tools to access actors‚ influence on collective decision-making either for the purpose of designing a voting organ or to model particular policy cases. This paper makes an attempt to reduce a dynamic voting process into a cooperative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004984921