Bargaining with Endogenous Deadlines

We develop a two-person negotiation model with complete information which makes endogenous both the deadline and the level of surplus destruction after the deadline. We show that the equilibrium outcome is always unique but might be inefficient. Moreover, as the bargaining period becomes short or as the players become very patient, the unique outcome is always inefficient

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Year of publication:	2001-08-01
Authors:	MAULEON, Ana ; VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent J.
Institutions:	Institut de Recherche Économique et Sociale (IRES), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain
Subject:	bargaining \| alternating-offers \| deadlines \| complete infomation

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales).
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	The text is part of a series UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) Number 2001021 1 pages long
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; J50 - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining. General ; J52 - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004985085