We consider a dual labor market with a continuum of heterogeneous workers differentiated by their ability of acquiring a specific training. In the primary sector, jobs require specific training and firms set efficiency wages. In the secondary sector, wages are competitive and no training is...

We introduce an efficiency-wage mechanism into an innovation-driven growth model. Due to informational problems, the labour market is segmented and homogeneous workers may be employed either in a non-competitive intermediate sector or in a competitive research one. We analyse the impact that...

We consider efficiency wage effects in a union-firm bargaining model with private information. We show that efficiency wage effects do not necessarily increase the wage level at equilibrium. However, if it is commonly known that the union is stronger than the firm and the productivity enhancing...

Cet article étend l’analyse des jeux stratégiques de marché au modèle à générations imbriquées? Nous considérons une économie avec un bien et de la monnaie de crédit où les stratégies des agents sont du type “achat ou vente”. Nous montrons que l’existence d’un équilibre...

Have new classicists invented market clearing or have they rehabilited it ? This is the question addressed in the present paper. It is generally agreed that market clearing underpins Walrasian theory, so my exploration is limited to the question of whether this is also true for Marshallian...

The label “Keynes-Negishi equiibria” is attached here to equilibria in a monetary economy with imperfectly competitive product and labor markets where business firms and labor unions hold demand perceptions with kinks - as posited in Negishi’s 1979 book Microeconomic Foundations of...

This article examines the question of which institutional assumptions underly competitive general equilibrium theory. Extending Walra’s terminology, the organization of trade hypothesis typical of this theory is called tâtonnement. Its components and its working principles are analysed...

In this paper, we challenge the usual argument which says that competition is a fair mechanism because it ranks individuals according to their relative preferences between effort and leisure. This argument, we claim, is very insuficient as a justification of fairness in competiton, and we show...

The aim of this article is to assess Friedman’s claim, put forward in his 1949 article on the Marshallian demand curve, that there is a methodological divide between the Marshallian and Walrasian approaches. Friedman’s argument will be critically examined and compared with the views he...

The consequences of imposing a minimum real income are studied within the framework of a general equilibrium model in which unemployment is compensated by transfers. With a disaggregated labor market, the equilibrium distribution of employment and real wages is characterized, depending on th...