We develop a network-flow approach for characterizing interim-allocation rules that can be implemented by ex post allocations. Our method can be used to characterize feasible interim allocations in general multi-unit auctions where agents face capacity constraints, both ceilings and floors....

We study the impact of crossholdings on the efficiency of the standard auction formats. The ascending auction is not equivalent to the second-price auction. In a class of examples, the ascending auction is the only efficient standard auction format.

This paper analyzes how all-pay auctions with endogenous prizes can be used to provide effort incentives. We show that wide classes of effort distributions can be implemented as equilibrium outcomes of such games. We also ask how all-pay auctions have to be structured so as to induce high...

An auction is externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave the other bidders’ payoffs unaffected. The equilibrium and its outcome will then persist if certain types of externalities arise between bidders. One example are externalities due to spiteful preferences, which...

This paper examines how shareholdings affect auctions' revenue and efficiency with independent private values. Two types of shareholdings are analyzed: vertical (resp: horizontal) toeholds cover situations in which bidders own a fraction of the seller's profit (resp: a share of their...

This research explores the effect of the introduction of online reverse auctions (ORAs) on interorganizational trust between buyers and suppliers in the retail industry. Building upon the notion of the spirit of the technology and the organizing vision, we shed light on the "equivoque" nature of...

This research explores the effect of the introduction of online reverse auctions (ORAs) on interorganizational trust between buyers and suppliers in the retail industry. Building upon the notion of the spirit of the technology and the organizing vision, we shed light on the "equivoque" nature of...