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Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide flexibly which task his agent should execute. However, there is a tradeoff, first pointed out by Simon (1951), between flexibility and employer moral hazard. An employment contract allows the principal to adjust the task quickly to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817249
Previous experimental work provides encouraging support for some of the central assumptions underlying Hart and Moore (2008)’s theory of contractual reference points. However, existing studies ignore realistic aspects of trading relationships such as informal agreements and ex post...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009358972
Several recent papers argue that contracts provide reference points that affect ex post behavior. We test this hypothesis in a canonical buyer-seller relationship with renegotiation. Our paper provides causal experimental evidence that an initial contract has a highly significant and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604136
We examine a “Rotten Kid” model (Becker 1974) where a player with social preferences interacts with an egoistic player. We assume that social preferences are intentionbased rather than outcome-based. In a very general multi-stage setting we show that any equilibrium must involve mutually...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008545923
We introduce intention-based social preferences into a mechanism design framework with independent private values and quasilinear payoffs. For the case where the designer has no information about the intensity of social preferences, we provide conditions under which mechanisms which have been...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010817273
We conducted an experiment with 182 inmates from a maximum security prison to analyze the impact of criminal identity … salience on cheating. The results show that inmates cheat more when we exogenously render their criminal identity more salient …. This effect is specific to individuals who have a criminal identity, because an additional placebo experiment shows that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011277310
. Using individual and county-level data, we document causal effects on trust and ethnic identity of an exogenous outburst of … intense fighting decreases generalized trust and increases ethnic identity. The effects are quantitatively large and robust to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009386338
Well-functioning groups enforce social norms that restrain opportunism, but the social structure of a society may encourage or inhibit norm enforcement. Here we study how the exogenous assignment to different positions in an extreme social hierarchy – the caste system – affects...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008625740
This paper shows that reciprocity has powerful implications for many economic domains. It is an important determinant in the enforcement of contracts and social norms and enhances the possibilities of collective action greatly. Reciprocity may render the provision of explicit incentive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005184890
Social norms are usually neglected in economics, because they are to a large extent enforced through non-market interactions and difficult to isolate empirically. In this paper, we offer a direct measure of the social norm to work and we show that this norm has important economic effects. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005585651