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Relative Rewards within Team-Based Compensation

Irlenbusch, Bernd; Ruchala, Gabriele K. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006

How to design compensation schemes to motivate team members appears to be one of the most challenging problems in the economic analysis of labour provision. We shed light on this issue by experimentally investigating team-based compensations with and without bonuses awarded to the highest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005233887

How Many Winners Are Good to Have? On Tournaments with Sabotage

Harbring, Christine; Irlenbusch, Bernd - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2005

From an employer's perspective a tournament should induce agents to exert productive activities but refrain from destructive ones. We experimentally test the predictive power of a tournament model which suggests that - within a reasonable framework - productive and destructive activities are not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762439

Incentives in Tournaments with Endogenous Prize Selection

Harbring, Christine; Irlenbusch, Bernd - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2004

-world organizations we employ a controlled experiment. Our data provide clear evidence that agents’ behavior is not only guided by …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005566800

The Good, the Bad and the Naive: Do Fair Prices Signal Good Types or Do They Induce Good Behaviour?

Dulleck, Uwe; Johnston, David W.; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; … - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2012

Evidence on behavior of experts in credence goods markets raises an important causality issue: Do "fair prices" induce "good behavior", or do "good experts" post "fair prices"? To answer this question we propose and test a model with three seller types: "the good" choose fair prices and behave...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011279266

Lying and Team Incentives

Conrads, Julian; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Rilke, Rainer Michael; … - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2011

We investigate the influence of two widespread compensation schemes, individual piece-rates and team incentives, on participants' inclination to lie, by adapting the experimental setup of Fischbacher and Heusi (2008). Lying turns out to be more pronounced under team incentives than under...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009294841

Incentives, Decision Frames, and Motivation Crowding Out - An Experimental Investigation

Irlenbusch, Bernd; Sliwka, Dirk - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2005

A simple principal agent problem is experimentally investigated in which a principal repeatedly sets a wage and an agent responds by choosing an effort level. The principal's payoff is determined by the agent's effort. In a first setting the principal can only set a fixed wage in each period. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005761948

Efficiency Gains from Team-Based Coordination: Large-Scale Experimental Evidence

Feri, Francesco; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Sutter, Matthias - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2008

coordinate with other teams. We present an experiment with 825 participants, using six different coordination games, where either …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703430

The Economics of Credence Goods: On the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation and Competition

Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2009

inefficiencies, such as under- and overtreatment or market break-down. We study in a large experiment with 936 participants the … has little influence, as predicted. Seller competition drives down prices and yields maximal trade, but does not lead to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822832

The Impact of Distributional Preferences on (Experimental) Markets for Expert Services

Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias; Dulleck, Uwe - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2009

, verifiability fails to yield efficiency in experiments with endogenous prices. We identify heterogeneous distributional preferences … as the main cause and design a parsimonious experiment with exogenous prices that allows classifying experts as either …-standard distributional preferences, among which efficiency-loving and inequality aversion are most frequent. We discuss implications for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008550001

Sabotage in Tournaments: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment

Harbring, Christine; Irlenbusch, Bernd - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2009

behavior is almost non-existent. We study sabotage in tournaments in a controlled laboratory experiment and are able to confirm …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004980267