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Eriksson, Tor; Villeval, Marie Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2010

-exchange experiment, the employer can express respect by giving the employee costly symbolic rewards after observing his level of effort …. This experiment sheds light on the extent to which symbolic rewards are used, how they affect employees’ further effort …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008678679

Self-Selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments

Eriksson, Tor; Teyssier, Sabrina; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006

to investigate the ex ante sorting effect of tournaments. This paper reports results from an experiment analyzing whether …-subject variance is substantially lower than when the same payment scheme is imposed. Mainly based on risk aversion, sorting is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005763542

Other-Regarding Preferences and Performance Pay – An Experiment on Incentives and Sorting

Eriksson, Tor; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2004

experiment that analyzes the influence of other-regarding preferences on sorting and incentives. Experimental evidence shows that … reciprocity and inequality aversion reduce the attraction of performance related pay. Other-regarding preferences influence both …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005763609

Feedback and Incentives: Experimental Evidence

Eriksson, Tor; Poulsen, Anders; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2008

This paper experimentally investigates the impact of different pay and relative performance information policies on employee effort. We explore three information policies: No feedback about relative performance, feedback given halfway through the production period, and continuously updated...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703358