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A Field Experiment in Motivating Employee Ideas

Gibbs, Michael; Neckermann, Susanne; Siemroth, Christoph - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2014

We study the effects of a field experiment designed to motivate employee ideas, at a large technology company. Employees were encouraged to submit ideas on process and product improvements via an online system. In the experiment, the company randomized 19 account teams into treatment and control...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884106

Can Contracts Signal Social Norms? Experimental Evidence

Danilov, Anastasia; Sliwka, Dirk - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2013

We investigate whether incentive schemes signal social norms and thus affect behavior beyond their direct economic consequences. A principal-agent experiment is studied in which prior to contract choice principals are informed about past actions of other agents and thus have more information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884174

Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking

Benabou, Roland; Tirole, Jean - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2013

talented workers leads to an escalating reliance on performance pay and other high-powered incentives, thereby shifting effort … distorts incentives downward in order to extract rents. More generally, as declining market frictions lead employers to compete …, while inequality tends to rise monotonically. Bonus caps and income taxes can help restore balance in agents' incentives and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010635587

Trust as a Signal of a Social Norm and the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes

Sliwka, Dirk - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006

. High-powered incentives may crowd out motivation as pessimism about the norm is conveyed. But by choosing fixed wages or …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005761807

On the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes

Sliwka, Dirk - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2003

By enriching a principal-agent model it is shown that the introduction of monetary incentives may reduce an agent … convictions of others, high powered incentives signal that not sticking to agreements is a widespread behavior and may lead to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005700905

Team Governance: Empowerment or Hierarchical Control

Friebel, Guido; Schnedler, Wendelin - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2007

We investigate a team setting in which workers have different degrees of commitment to the outcome of their work. We show that if there are complementarities in production and if the team manager has some information about team members, interventions that the manager undertakes in order to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703066

Social Norms and Economic Incentives in Firms

Huck, Steffen; Kübler, Dorothea; Weibull, Jörgen - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2010

This paper studies the interplay between economic incentives and social norms in firms. We introduce a general … also show how social norms can induce multiplicity of equilibria and how steeper economic incentives can reduce effort. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008684811

Psychological Foundations of Incentives

Fehr, Ernst; Falk, Armin - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2002

During the last two decades economists have made much progress in understanding incentives, contracts and organisations … effects of incentives. Economists may fail to understand the levels and the changes in behaviour if they neglect motives like … the desire to reciprocate or the desire to avoid social disapproval. We show that monetary incentives may backfire and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005566708