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This paper analyzes how private decisions and public policies are shaped by personal and societal preferences ("values"), material or other explicit incentives ("laws") and social sanctions or rewards ("norms"). It first examines how honor, stigma and social norms arise from individuals'...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009646323
inefficiencies, such as under- and overtreatment or market break-down. We study in a large experiment with 936 participants the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822832
A simple principal agent problem is experimentally investigated in which a principal repeatedly sets a wage and an agent responds by choosing an effort level. The principal's payoff is determined by the agent's effort. In a first setting the principal can only set a fixed wage in each period. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005761948
Reputation systems aim to induce honest behavior in online trade by providing information about past conduct of users. Online reputation, however, is not directly connected to a person, but only to the virtual identity of that person. Users can therefore shed a negative reputation by creating a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884234
experiment, where principals set wages and agents respond by choosing effort levels. In addition to the efforts the principals …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005233886
In recent decades, many firms offered more discretion to their employees, often increasing the productivity of effort but also leaving more opportunities for shirking. These "high-performance work systems" are difficult to understand in terms of standard moral hazard models. We show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008543256
Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide flexibly which task his agent should execute. However, there is a tradeoff, first pointed out by Simon (1951), between flexibility and employer moral hazard. An employment contract allows the principal to adjust the task quickly to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010598089
We experimentally investigate a simple version of Holmström’s career concerns model in which firms compete for agents in two consecutive periods. Profits of firms are determined by agents’ unknown ability and the effort they choose. Before making second-period wage offers firms are informed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005566413
Holmström’s (1982/99) career concerns model has become an important workhorse for the analysis of agency issues in many fields. The underlying signal jamming argument requires players to use information in a Bayesian way – which may or may not reasonably approximate real-life decision...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005566605
selfish or cooperative using simple social preference games and then test for behavioral differences between the two types in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005566817