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Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking
Benabou, Roland; Tirole, Jean - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2013
This paper analyzes the impact of labor market competition and skill-biased technical change on the structure of compensation. The model combines multitasking and screening, embedded into a Hotelling-like framework. Competition for the most talented workers leads to an escalating reliance on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010635587
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An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Insurance
Hagedorn, Marcus; Kaul, Ashok; Mennel, Tim - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2002
We derive the shape of optimal unemployment insurance (UI) contracts when agents can exert search effort but face different search costs and have private information about their type. We derive a recursive solution of our dynamic adverse selection problem with repeated moral hazard. Conditions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762054
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Hidden Action, Identification, and Organization Design
Schnedler, Wendelin - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2010
. What restricts implementability? When does re-organization help to overcome this restriction? This paper shows that any … moral hazard models yields insights into optimal organization design, uncovers the reason why certain organization designs …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008727777
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On the Prudence of Rewarding A While Hoping for B
Schnedler, Wendelin - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2003
In multiple-task hidden-action models, the (mis-)allocation of effort may play an important role for benefit creation … associated costs but also by the mis-allocation which they induce. How can mis-allocation be measured? This article presents two … requirements for such a measure (invariance and monotonicity) and analyses whether they are met by proposed measures of mis-allocation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005761834
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The Dilemma of Delegating Search: Budgeting in Public Employment Services
Addison, John T.; Altemeyer-Bartscher, Martin; Kuhn, Thomas - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2010
The poor performance often attributed to many public employment services may be explained in part by a delegation problem between the central office and local job centers. In markets characterized by frictions, job centers function as match-makers, linking job seekers with relevant vacancies....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008564693
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On the Optimality of Search Matching Equilibrium When Workers Are Risk Averse
Lehmann, Etienne; Van der Linden, Bruno - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2004
functions and wages are bargained over. The optimal allocation of resources is characterized first when information is perfect …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703087
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On the Sorting of Physicians across Medical Occupations
Courty, Pascal; Marschke, Gerald - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2008
health services relative to the first best allocation increases with occupational (moral hazard) risk. Occupations with risk …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703622
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The Hold-Down Problem and the Boundaries of the Firm: Lessons from a Hidden Action Model with Endogenous Outside Option
Schnedler, Wendelin; Sunde, Uwe - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2002
This paper offers a rationale for limiting the delegation of (real) authority, which neither relies on insurance arguments nor depends on ownership structure. We analyse a repeated hidden action model in which the actions of a risk neutral agent determine his future outside option. Consequently,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703716
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A Dynamic Analysis of the Demand for Health Insurance and Health Care
Bolhaar, Jonneke; Lindeboom, Maarten; van der Klaauw, Bas - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2008
We investigate the presence of moral hazard and advantageous or adverse selection in a market for supplementary health insurance. For this we specify and estimate dynamic models for health insurance decisions and health care utilization. Estimates of the health care utilization models indicate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822176
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Division of Labour and Directed Production
Ratto, Marisa; Schnedler, Wendelin - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2005
We examine a situation where efforts on different tasks positively affect production but are not separately verifiable and where the manager (principal) and the worker (agent) have different ideas about how production should be carried out: agents prefer a less efficient way of production. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822445