Showing 1 - 6 of 6
We investigate how bonus payments affect satisfaction and performance of managers in a large, multinational company. We find that falling behind a naturally occurring reference point for bonus comparisons reduces satisfaction and subsequent performance. The effects tend to be mitigated if...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008592860
Trait-based personality psychology and economics have taken different approaches to understanding individual differences, with the former emphasizing variables derived from the factor analysis of trait assessments, and the latter emphasizing variables derived from formal decision theory. In a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010742085
designs, and we investigate how teams aggregate individual preferences. We find that team decisions reveal less inequality … aversion than individual initial proposals in team decision-making. However, teams are no more selfish than individuals who … decide in isolation. Individuals express strategically more inequality aversion in their initial proposals in team decision …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884177
We investigate the influence of two widespread compensation schemes, individual piece-rates and team incentives, on … pronounced under team incentives than under individual piece-rates, which highlights a so far fairly neglected feature of these …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009294841
In organizations, some team members are assigned to a team for a predefined short period of time, e.g., as they have a … temporary contract, while others are permanent members of the same team. In a laboratory experiment we analyze the cooperation … levels resulting from diverse teams, where some team members remain with a team and others are switching teams. Our results …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011125872
We provide an explanation for peer pressure in teams based on inequity aversion. Analyzing a two-period model with two agents, we find that the effect of inequity aversion strongly depends on the information structure. When contributions are unobservable, agents act as if they were purely...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762201