In this paper, we analyze a principal's optimal feedback policy in tournaments. We close a gap in the literature by … assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy at the beginning of the tournament. Our analysis shows that …

-takes-all tournament. We find that, regardless of the pay scheme used, feedback does not improve performance. There are no significant peer … employee effort. We explore three information policies: No feedback about relative performance, feedback given halfway through … the production period, and continuously updated feedback. The pay schemes are a piece rate payment scheme and a winner …

A real effort experiment is investigated in which supervisors have to rate the performance of individual workers who in …

This paper studies the impact of incentives on worker self-selection in a controlled laboratory experiment. In a first …. Depending on the treatment, the variable payment is either a piece rate, a tournament or a revenue-sharing scheme. We elicit … findings are as follows. First, output is much higher in the variable pay schemes (piece rate, tournament, and revenue sharing …

to investigate the ex ante sorting effect of tournaments. This paper reports results from an experiment analyzing whether …. We show that when the subjects choose to enter a tournament, the average effort is higher and the between …

behavior is almost non-existent. We study sabotage in tournaments in a controlled laboratory experiment and are able to confirm … the presence of tournament incentives, agents react reciprocally to higher wages, which mitigates the sabotage problem …

experiment reproduces this model in the laboratory by means of various treatments in which we alter the variance of the …

experiment that analyzes the influence of other-regarding preferences on sorting and incentives. Experimental evidence shows that …

(1981) tournament model. In a second experiment, we investigate the effectiveness of corporate value statements to encourage … benchmark is tested in an experiment. Furthermore, we provide the first clean one-shot experimental test of the Lazear and Rosen …

real effort experiment with participants who work directly for organizations with clear missions. Weeks before the … experiment, we survey potential participants for their organizational preferences. At the experiment, we randomly assign workers …