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Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking
Benabou, Roland; Tirole, Jean - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2013
compensation. The model combines multitasking and screening, embedded into a Hotelling-like framework. Competition for the most …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010635587
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Negative Externalities and Equilibrium Existence in Competitive Markets with Adverse Selection
von Siemens, Ferdinand; Kosfeld, Michael - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2009
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) show that there need not exist a competitive equilibrium in markets with adverse selection. Building on their framework we demonstrate that externalities between agents − an agent's utility upon accepting a contract depends on the average type attracted by the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004976877
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How Do Informal Agreements and Renegotiation Shape Contractual Reference Points?
Fehr, Ernst; Hart, Oliver; Zehnder, Christian - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2011
such as informal agreements and ex post renegotiation. We investigate the relevance of these features experimentally. Our … the presence of informal agreements and ex post renegotiation. However, our data also reveal new behavioral features that … renegotiation changes how trading parties evaluate ex post outcomes. Interestingly, the availability of these additional options …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009371874
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Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs
Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2010
-sharing, screening opportunities, and competition are important driving forces behind these new forms of work organization. We document … control strategy prevails, while the possibility of screening renders the trust strategy profitable. The introduction of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008543256
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Testing Canonical Tournament Theory: On the Impact of Risk, Social Preferences and Utility Structure
Sheremeta, Roman M.; Wu, Steven Y. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2012
We use experiments to test comparative statics predictions of canonical tournament theory. Both the roles of principal and agent are populated by human subjects, allowing us to test predictions for both incentive responses and optimal tournament design. Consistent with theory, we observed an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009646321
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Hidden Action, Identification, and Organization Design
Schnedler, Wendelin - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2010
Incentives often fail in inducing economic agents to engage in a desirable activity; implementability is restricted. What restricts implementability? When does re-organization help to overcome this restriction? This paper shows that any restriction of implementability is caused by an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008727777
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Relative Performance Pay, Bonuses, and Job-Promotion Tournaments
Kräkel, Matthias; Schöttner, Anja - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2008
Several empirical studies have challenged tournament theory by pointing out that (1) there is considerable pay variation within hierarchy levels, (2) promotion premiums only in part explain hierarchical wage differences and (3) external recruitment is observable on nearly any hierarchy level. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822027
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Worker Self-Selection and the Profits from Cooperation
Kosfeld, Michael; von Siemens, Ferdinand - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2008
We investigate a competitive labor market with team production. Workers differ in their motivation to exert team effort and types are private information. We show that there can exist a separating equilibrium in which workers self-select into different firms and firms employing cooperative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822981
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Producer Protection Legislation and Termination Damages in the Presence of Contracting Frictions
Wu, Steven Y. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2009
This study models producer protection legislation that would grant growers the right to claim damages (PPLD) if their contracts are prematurely terminated. In the absence of contracting frictions that prevent contractors from redesigning contracts to accommodate exogenous policy changes, PPLD...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005103260
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Search and Retirement under Asymmetric Information
Bi, Sheng; Langot, François - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2014
implement a screening process when the information is asymmetric. We show that the optimal separating contract (an ascending …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010790513