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Performance Pay and the Erosion of Worker Cooperation: Field Experimental Evidence
Burks, Stephen; Carpenter, Jeffrey; Goette, Lorenz - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006
We report the results of a field experiment with bicycle messengers in Switzerland and the United States. Messenger work is individualized enough that firms can choose to condition pay on it, but significant externalities in messenger behavior nonetheless give their on-the-job interactions the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703260
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How Many Winners Are Good to Have? On Tournaments with Sabotage
Harbring, Christine; Irlenbusch, Bernd - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2005
From an employer's perspective a tournament should induce agents to exert productive activities but refrain from destructive ones. We experimentally test the predictive power of a tournament model which suggests that - within a reasonable framework - productive and destructive activities are not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762439
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The Limits of Self-Governance in the Presence of Spite: Experimental Evidence from Urban and Rural Russia
Gächter, Simon; Herrmann, Benedikt - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006
We report evidence from public goods experiments with and without punishment which we conducted in Russia with 566 urban and rural participants of young and mature age cohorts. Russia is interesting for studying voluntary cooperation because of its long history of collectivism, and a huge...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005763774
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Incentives in Tournaments with Endogenous Prize Selection
Harbring, Christine; Irlenbusch, Bernd - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2004
competition between agents but also by the possibility to punish the principal via sabotage. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005566800
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Risk, Delegation, and Project Scope
Roider, Andreas - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2007
This paper studies a partial-contracting model where an agent may provide effort to increase a project’s scope before some later decisions have to be taken. Consistent with existing empirical evidence, we find a positive relationship between exogenous risk and delegation. That is, we show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703275
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Better Means More: Property Rights and High-Growth Aspiration Entrepreneurship
Estrin, Saul; Korosteleva, Julia; Mickiewicz, Tomasz - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2009
This paper contrasts the determinants of entrepreneurial entry and high-growth aspiration entrepreneurship. Using the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) surveys for 42 countries over the period 1998-2005, we analyse how institutional environment and entrepreneurial characteristics affect...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005015496
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Contracting with Private Information
Hagedorn, Marcus - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2003
asymmetric information. We consider the consequences of asymmetric information for investment decisions and for the assignment of … and Moore still hold. It is shown that investment incentives are guided by an additional element to standard hold …-up models since the outcome of bargaining depends directly on the investment level. This may for example result in cooperative …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762029
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Which Institutions Encourage Entrepreneurs to Create Larger Firms?
Estrin, Saul; Korosteleva, Julia; Mickiewicz, Tomasz - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2011
We develop entrepreneurship and institutional theory to explain variation in different types of entrepreneurship across individuals and institutional contexts. Our framework generates hypotheses about the negative impact of higher levels of corruption, weaker property rights and especially...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008839291
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Delegation of Authority as an Optimal (In)complete Contract
Roider, Andreas - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2004
consider a hold-up framework where both parties profit from an investment that raises the value of an asset. Delegation turns …) decisions have no investment-independent effect. If overinvestment might be an issue, delegation, however, with restricted …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005566762
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Competition and the Ratchet Effect
Charness, Gary; Kuhn, Peter J.; Villeval, Marie-Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2008
competition for principals or agents. While we do observe substantial and significant ratchet effects in the baseline (no … competition) case of our model, we find that ratchet behavior is nearly eliminated by labor-market competition; interestingly this …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005233858