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group task (GT) or an individual task (IT) and, second, choose work effort. In their choices of task and effort the agents … work groups and can positively influence group performance. Larger payment increases the share of socially motivated agents …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822552
workers regularly overstate their own contribution to the joint team output. Misreporting seems to spread distrust within the … team of workers, as well as between managers and workers. This manifests itself in managers being less generous with … workers' actual contributions to the team output is beneficial for the success of gift-exchange relationships. Yet, workers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011125865
designs, and we investigate how teams aggregate individual preferences. We find that team decisions reveal less inequality … aversion than individual initial proposals in team decision-making. However, teams are no more selfish than individuals who … decide in isolation. Individuals express strategically more inequality aversion in their initial proposals in team decision …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884177
We investigate the influence of two widespread compensation schemes, individual piece-rates and team incentives, on … pronounced under team incentives than under individual piece-rates, which highlights a so far fairly neglected feature of these …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009294841
In organizations, some team members are assigned to a team for a predefined short period of time, e.g., as they have a … temporary contract, while others are permanent members of the same team. In a laboratory experiment we analyze the cooperation … levels resulting from diverse teams, where some team members remain with a team and others are switching teams. Our results …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011125872
We provide an explanation for peer pressure in teams based on inequity aversion. Analyzing a two-period model with two agents, we find that the effect of inequity aversion strongly depends on the information structure. When contributions are unobservable, agents act as if they were purely...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762201