Similar Search Results

Gift Exchange in the Workplace: Money or Attention?

Dur, Robert - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2008

We develop a model of manager-employee relationships where employees care more for their manager when they are more convinced that their manager cares for them. Managers can signal their altruistic feelings towards their employees in two ways: by offering a generous wage and by giving attention....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822723

Reciprocity and Incentive Pay in the Workplace

Dur, Robert; Non, Arjan; Roelfsema, Hein - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2010

We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008506073

Relational Contracts and the Nature of Market Interactions

Brown, Martin; Falk, Armin; Fehr, Ernst - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2003

We provide evidence that long-term relationships between trading parties emerge endogenously in the absence of third party enforcement of contracts and are associated with a fundamental change in the nature of market interactions. Without third party enforcement, the vast majority of trades are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703546

The Spot Market Matters: Evidence on Implicit Contracts from Britain

Devereux, Paul J.; Hart, Robert A. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2005

Based on the methodology of Beaudry and DiNardo (1991), this paper investigates the relative importance of the spot market and implicit contracts in the determination of British real wages. Empirical work is carried out separately for males and females with individuallevel data taken from the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823009

Implicit Contracts, Unemployment, and Labor Market Segmentation

Altmann, Steffen; Falk, Armin; Huffman, David - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2010

We analyze the impact of imperfect contract enforcement on the emergence of unemployment. In an experimental labor market where trading parties can form long-term employment relationships, we compare a work environment where effort is observable, but not verifiable to a situation where explicit...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008602725

Do the Selfish Mimic Cooperators? Experimental Evidence from Finitely-Repeated Labor Markets

Roe, Brian E.; Wu, Steven Y. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2009

Experimental studies have consistently shown that cooperative outcomes can emerge even in finitely repeated games. Such outcomes are justified by existing reputation building models, which suggest that cooperative outcomes can be sustained if some subjects have other-regarding preferences. While...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005566817

Are Teams Less Inequality Averse than Individuals?

He, Haoran; Villeval, Marie Claire - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2014

designs, and we investigate how teams aggregate individual preferences. We find that team decisions reveal less inequality … aversion than individual initial proposals in team decision-making. However, teams are no more selfish than individuals who … decide in isolation. Individuals express strategically more inequality aversion in their initial proposals in team decision …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884177

Lying and Team Incentives

Conrads, Julian; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Rilke, Rainer Michael; … - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2011

We investigate the influence of two widespread compensation schemes, individual piece-rates and team incentives, on … pronounced under team incentives than under individual piece-rates, which highlights a so far fairly neglected feature of these …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009294841

Transparency, Inequity Aversion, and the Dynamics of Peer Pressure in Teams: Theory and Evidence

Mohnen, Alwine; Pokorny, Kathrin; Sliwka, Dirk - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2008

We provide an explanation for peer pressure in teams based on inequity aversion. Analyzing a two-period model with two agents, we find that the effect of inequity aversion strongly depends on the information structure. When contributions are unobservable, agents act as if they were purely...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762201

Cooperation in Diverse Teams: The Role of Temporary Group Membership

Grund, Christian; Harbring, Christine; Thommes, Kirsten - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2015

In organizations, some team members are assigned to a team for a predefined short period of time, e.g., as they have a … temporary contract, while others are permanent members of the same team. In a laboratory experiment we analyze the cooperation … levels resulting from diverse teams, where some team members remain with a team and others are switching teams. Our results …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011125872