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The Consequences of a Piece Rate on Quantity and Quality: Evidence from a Field Experiment
Heywood, John S.; Siebert, W. Stanley; Wei, Xiangdong - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2013
workers that differ in monitoring intensity as they move from time to piece rates. The application of piece rates increases … quantity, and we find that the resultant quality can be improved with sufficient monitoring. "Committed" workers also produce … results thus show how a firm can refine its worker selection and monitoring options together with the payment system to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010700365
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How Often Should You Open the Door? Optimal Monitoring to Screen Heterogeneous Agents
Ichino, Andrea; Muehlheusser, Gerd - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2004
This paper shows that monitoring too much a partner in the initial phase of a relationship may not be optimal if the … is simple: by monitoring too much we learn less on how the partner will behave when he is not monitored. Only by giving …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703754
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Should You Allow Your Agent to Become Your Competitor? On Non-Compete Agreements in Employment Contracts
Kräkel, Matthias; Sliwka, Dirk - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2006
We discuss a principal-agent model in which the principal has the opportunity to include a non-compete agreement in the employment contract. We show that not imposing such an agreement can be beneficial for the principal as the possibility to leave the firm generates implicit incentives for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703004
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Authority and Incentives in Organizations
Kräkel, Matthias - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2013
situation, decentralization is the optimal form of full delegation given that selfish behavior is more important than … more efficient than the CEO, the owner will choose centralization given that cooperation is the dominating issue, but …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010632999
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Market Characteristics, Intra-Firm Coordination, and the Choice of Human Resource Management Systems: Evidence from New Japanese Data
Kato, Takao; Owan, Hideo - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2007
This paper explores theoretically and empirically potentially important yet often-neglected linkage between task coordination within the organization and the structure of organization and bundling of HRMPs (Human Resource Management Practices). In so doing, we also provide fresh insights on the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703136
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The Adoption and Diffusion of Organizational Innovation: Evidence for the U.S. Economy
Lynch, Lisa M. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2007
Using a unique longitudinal representative survey of both manufacturing and nonmanufacturing businesses in the United States during the 1990’s, I examine the incidence and intensity of organizational innovation and the factors associated with investments in organizational innovation. Past...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703412
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Extrinsic Rewards and Intrinsic Motives: Standard and Behavioral Approaches to Agency and Labor Markets
Rebitzer, James B.; Taylor, Lowell J. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2010
Employers structure pay and employment relationships to mitigate agency problems. A large literature in economics documents how the resolution of these problems shapes personnel policies and labor markets. For the most part, the study of agency in employment relationships relies on highly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008560408
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Use and Abuse of Authority: A Behavioral Foundation of the Employment Relation
Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2012
Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide flexibly which task his agent should execute. However, there is a tradeoff, first pointed out by Simon (1951), between flexibility and employer moral hazard. An employment contract allows the principal to adjust the task quickly to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010598089
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Subjective Evaluations: Discretionary Bonuses and Feedback Credibility
Fuchs, William - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2013
We provide a new rationale for the use of discretionary bonuses. In a setting with unknown match qualities between a worker and a firm and subjective evaluations by the principal, bonuses are useful in order to make the feedback from the firm to the workers credible. This way workers in good...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010720080
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The Firm as the Locus of Social Comparisons: Internal Labor Markets versus Up-or-Out
Auriol, Emmanuelle; Friebel, Guido; Lammers, Frauke - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2012
We suggest a parsimonious dynamic agency model in which workers have status concerns. A firm is a promotion hierarchy in which a worker's status depends on past performance. We investigate the optimality of two types of promotion hierarchies: (i) internal labor markets, in which agents have a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009649815