Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 74
Cover Image
The Division of Labor and the Market for Organizations.
Lindbeck, A.; Snower, D.J. - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 2000
The paper examines the determinants of the division of labor within firms. It provides an explanation of the pervasive observed changes in work organization away from the traditional functional departments and towards multi-tasking and job rotation.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005670117
Cover Image
Person-Organization Fit and Incentives: A Causal Test
Andersson, Ola; Huysentruyt, Marieke; Miettinen, Topi; … - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 2014
We investigate the effects of organizational culture and personal value orientations on performance under individual and team contest incentives. We develop a model of regard for others and in-group favoritism predicting interaction effects between organizational culture and personal values in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010818327
Cover Image
The Division of Labor and the Market for Organizations
Lindbeck, Assar; Snower, Dennis J. - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 2000
The paper examines the determinants of the division of labor within firms. It provides an explanation of the pervasive observed changes in work organization away from the traditional functional departments and toward multi-tasking and job rotation. Whereas the existing literature on the division...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005082494
Cover Image
Services in Industry: An International Comparison
Pousette, Tomas - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 1987
No abstract.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010818333
Cover Image
Globalization of Monitoring Practices: The Case of American Influences on the Dismissal Risk of European CEOs
Oxelheim, Lars; Randoy, Trond - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 2013
This study examines globalization of monitoring practices by focusing on how American (U.S.) influences on European firms impact the dismissal risk for these firms' CEOs. Specifically, we argue that the stronger short term orientation of the American corporate governance system increase the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010648281
Cover Image
Globalization of Corporate Covernance: The American Influence on Dismissal Performance Sensitivity of European CEOs
Jungeilges, Jochen A.; Oxelheim, Lars; Randoy, Trond - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 2010
This study examines how globalization of corporate governance practices influence the risk of European CEOs being dismissed. We argue that the harsh monitoring of the American corporate governance system spills over to the rest of the world as a result of this globalization. We focus on direct...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008562416
Cover Image
How to Avoid Compensating CEO for Luck: The Case of Microeconomic Fluctuations
Oxelheim, Lars; Wihlborg, Clas; Zhang, Jianhua - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 2010
Incentive effects of performance-based compensation schemes for management may be weakened or biased by macroeconomic influences on remuneration. These influences can be seen as reflecting luck from the CEO’s perspective. In this chapter we present a model for how to avoid compensating CEO for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008553045
Cover Image
Why Are There So Few Female Top Executives in Egalitarian Welfare States?
Henrekson, Magnus; Stenkula, Mikael - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 2009
We identify pertinent institutions governing the structure of payoffs with regard to female career progression. Drawing on recent insights in behavioral economics, we hypothesize that interactions between psychological mechanisms and the institutional setup may be important determinants of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005645347
Cover Image
Executive Compensation and Macroeconomic Fluctuations
Oxelheim, Lars; Wihlborg, Clas; Zhang, Jianhoa - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 2008
Macroeconomic fluctuations affect corporations’ performance through demand and cost conditions. Incentive effects of performance-based compensation schemes for management may be weakened or biased by macroeconomic influences if management is unable to forecast macroeconomic fluctuations or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005645433
Cover Image
Do Entrenched Managers Pay Their Workers More?
Svaleryd, helena - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 2005
find that entrenched managers pay their workers more. For example, our estimates show that CEOs with more control rights … as evidence of agency problems between shareholders and managers affecting workers’ pay. The findings do not appear to be … with an agency model in which entrenched managers pay high wages because they come with private benefits, such as lower …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005645442