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WHY DOES THE PIRATE DECIDE TO BE THE LEADER IN PRICES?

Martínez-Sánchez, Francisco - Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) - 2007

government and incumbent have a key role in avoiding the entry of the pirate. We show that the government will not help the … welfare. However, he will let the pirate enters as a follower or as a leader, or encourage the incumbent to deter the entry of …We analyze the roles of the government and the incumbent in preventing piracy, and the reasons and incentives why a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005515937

DOWNSTREAM MERGERS AND ENTRY

Faulí-Oller, Ramón; Sandonís, Joel - Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) - 2007

unconcentrated markets. Finally, the expectation of monopolization stimulates wasteful entry of downstream firms in the industry …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005731303

STRATEGIC EFFECTS OF AIRLINE ALLIANCES

Colonques, Rafael Moner; Fillol, Ricardo Flores - Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) - 2006

This paper looks at the endogenous formation of airline alliances bymeans of a two-stage game where first airlines decide whether to form analliance and then fares are determined. We analyze the profitability and thestrategic effects of airline alliances when two complementary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005212595

Collusion, competition and piracy

Martínez-Sánchez, Francisco - Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) - 2009

In this paper we analyze firms' ability to tacitly collude on pricesin an infinitely repeated duopoly game of vertical productdifferentiation. We show that firms collude if and only if their discountfactor is high enough, i.e. if they value future profits sufficiently. We alsoshow that a lower...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005082634

PRICING TO MARKET BEHAVIOR IN OLIGOPOLISTIC COMPETITION: A MICROECONOMETRIC APPROACH

Balaguer, Jacint; Jiménez, Ezequiel Uriel; Orts, Vicente - Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) - 2003

This paper takes into account the presence of oligopolistic rivalry between exporters to evaluate their pricing to market behavior. We specify the pricing policy as a simultaneous equation model, which captures the effects of possible interactions in multiple destination markets. The use of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005731103

MERGERS IN A PARTIALLY CARTELIZED MARKET

Escrihuela, Marc - Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) - 2003

The paper studies a Partial Cartel model where only a subset of firms colludes. In this model, firms' ability to collude depends on the discount factor. In addition, as hardly any attention has been given by the literature to the case where mergers take place in a collusive framework, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005812852

Marketing cooperation for differentiated products

Peitz, Martin - Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) - 1996

In a three-stage duopoly game with product design at stage 1, advertising & marketing at stage 2, and price competition at stage 3, advertising & marketing enable customers to distinguish the goods from each other thus relaxing price competition. The subgame perfect equilibria of the three stage...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008542875

EXPLAINING MARKET POWER DIFFERENCES IN BANKING: A CROSS-COUNTRY STUDY

Nagore, Amparo; Villarroya, Joaquín Maudos - Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) - 2005

This paper presents evidence on the impact of bank-specific, regulatory, institutional, macro and financial development variables on competition in banking, using information at both national and bank level. With this aim, Lerner indices of market power are estimated using a sample of 10,479...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005731195

EQUILIBRIUM INVESTMENT IS REDUCED IF WE ALLOW FOR FORWARD CONTRACTS

Grimm, Veronika; Zoettl, Gregor - Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) - 2006

In this paper we analyze incentives to invest in capacity prior to asequence of Cournot spot markets with varying demand. We compareequilibrium investment in the absence and in presence of the possibility to tradeon forward markets. We find that the possibility to trade forwards...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005731221

STORE VS. NATIONAL BRANDS: A PRODUCT LINE MIX PUZZLE

Monerris, José J. Sempere; Colonques, Rafael Moner; … - Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) - 2007

This paper examines retailers' strategic decisions about store brand introduction when each retailer can stock a limited number of brands. The different product line mix equilibria depend on demand parameters that measure the cross-effect across national and store brands and the cross-effect...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005731228