In a three-stage duopoly game with product design at stage 1, advertising & marketing at stage 2, and price competition at stage 3, advertising & marketing enable customers to distinguish the goods from each other thus relaxing price competition. The subgame perfect equilibria of the three stage...

Two one-product firms compete in prices on a market with differentiated products. Goods are differentiated because customers switch from one good to the other at different relative prices. With the specification that mean demand in the market is unit-elastic 1 pro vide conditions on the shape of...

In a model of price competition single-product ¯rms compete for consumers. Consumerspurchase a variable quantity of one of the di®erentiated goods. The paper provides results onequilibrium existence when consumers are heterogeneous in their evaluation of the di®erentiatedgoods among each...

In this paper we analyze the strategic decisions of the government, the incumbent and the pirate in a market where the good is piratable. We show that deterred or accommodated piracy can occur in equilibrium, but pure monopoly cannot occur for any anti-piracy policy. We also show that the...