The supply shock that hit the Nordic electricity market in 2002-2003 put the market to a severe test. A sharp reduction in inflow to hydro reservoirs during the normally wet months of late autumn pushed electricity prices to unprecedented levels. We take this event as the starting point for...

The purpose of this study is to elucidate under which circumstances, how, and to what extent market power on the TGC market can be used to affect the entire electricity market. There are basically two reasons for being concerned with market power in TGC markets. One is that a small number of...

Markets for environmental externalities are typically closely related to the markets causing such externalities, whereupon strategic interaction may result. Along these lines, the market for Green Certificates is strongly interwoven in the electricity market as the producers of green electricity...

Abstract. This paper considers a fairly large class of noncooperative games in which strategies are jointly constrained. When what is called the Ky Fan or Nikaidô-Isoda function is convex-concave, selected Nash equilibria correspond to diagonal saddle points of that function. This feature is...

Emission of uniformly dispersed greenhouse gases in construed here as a cooperative production game, featuring side-payments, quata exchange, uncertainty, and multi-period planning. Stochastic programming offers good instruments to analyze such games. Absent efficient markets for emissions, such...

The main objects below are transferable-utility games in which each agent faces an optimization problem, briefly called production planning, constrained by his resource endowment. Coalitions can pool members's resources. Such production games are here extended to accomodate uncertainty about...

We model repeated play of noncooperative stage games in terms of approximate gradient steps. That simple format require little information and no optimization. Moreover, it allows players to evaluate marginal cost or profit inexactly and to move with different velocities. Uncertainty can also be...

Accomodated here is a measure space of economic agents, each regarded as a profit maximizing producer, each endowed with his technology and resource bundle. Pooling of private endowments generates a cooperative game with side payments.

We provide a new and simple convergence analysis for fictitious play of two-person, two-strategy games. Some generalizations are also given.

Owners of stochastic assets can pool their endowments to smoothen and insure individual payoffs across outcomes and time. We explore, in such a setting, how contingent shadow prices on aggregate resources can be used for three purposes: first, to design mutual contracts for risk averse agents;...