STRATEGIC DELEGATION IN CONSUMER COOPERATIVES UNDER MIXED OLIGOPOLY.
Year of publication: |
2013
|
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Authors: | Kopel, Michael ; Marini, Marco |
Institutions: | Facoltà di Economia, Università degli Studi di Urbino |
Subject: | Consumer Cooperatives | Strategic Incentives | Price Competition | Oligopoly |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Number 1306 21 pages |
Classification: | C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; C71 - Cooperative Games ; D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection |
Source: |
-
OPTIMAL COMPENSATION STRUCTURE IN CONSUMER COOPERATIVES UNDER MIXED OLIGOPOLY
Kopel, Michael, (2012)
-
Optimal Compensation Structure in Consumer Cooperatives Under Mixed Oligopoly
Kopel, Michael, (2012)
-
Coalitional Approaches to Collusive Agreements in Oligopoly Games
Currarini, Sergio, (2020)
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The strategic timing of R&D agreements.
Marini, Marco, (2011)
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Lead, Follow or Cooperate? Endogenous Timing & Cooperation in Symmetric Duopoly Games.
Marini, Marco, (2011)
-
Coalitional Approaches to Collusive Agreements in Oligopoly Games.
Currarini, Sergio, (2011)
- More ...