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Values on regular games under Kirchhoff’s laws

Lange, Fabien; Grabisch, Michel - Keleti Károly Gazdasági Kar, Óbudai Egyetem - 2006

game among players. In this paper, we address a general framework leading to applications to games with communication …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823508

Power indices when players can commit to reject coalitions

Kóczy, László Á. - Keleti Károly Gazdasági Kar, Óbudai Egyetem - 2013

Power indices have been used to evaluate the allocation of power in a wide range of voting situations. While they use the language of game theory known measures of a priori voting power are hardly more than statistical expectations assuming the random behaviour of the players. We introduce a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011106649

Fair Apportionment in the View of the Venice Commission's Recommendation

Kóczy, László Á.; Sziklai, Balázs; Biró, Péter - Keleti Károly Gazdasági Kar, Óbudai Egyetem - 2013

In this paper we analyze the consequences of the fairness recommendation of the Venice Commission in allocating voting districts among larger administrative regions. This recommendation requires the size of any constituency not to differ from the average constituency size by more than a fixed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011106650

Introduction into the literature of cooperative game theory with special emphasis on dynamic games and the core

Szikora, Péter - Keleti Károly Gazdasági Kar, Óbudai Egyetem

Cooperative games model situations where the actors can collaborate, can form coalitions. There exist many static …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010878377

Electing the Pope

Kóczy, László Á.; Sziklai, Balázs - Keleti Károly Gazdasági Kar, Óbudai Egyetem - 2013

Few elections attract so much attention as the Papal Conclave that elects the religious leader of over a billion Catholics worldwide. The Conclave is an interesting case of qualied majority voting with many participants and no formal voting blocks. Each cardinal is a well-known public figure...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010878383

Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core

Kóczy, László Á. - Keleti Károly Gazdasági Kar, Óbudai Egyetem - 2012

We study coalitional games where the coalitional payoffs depend on the entire coalition structure. We introduce a …, a generalisation of the core to such games. In order to extend past results limited to totally recursive …-balanced partition function form games we introduce subgame-consistency that requires perfectness in relevant subgames only, while some …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010878385

Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities

Kóczy, László Á. - Keleti Károly Gazdasági Kar, Óbudai Egyetem - 2006

The sequential coalition formation model of Bloch (1996) to solve cooperative games with externalities exhibits some …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005764538

Proximity in coalition building

Reynaud, Julien; Lange, Fabien; Gatarek, Lukasz; … - Keleti Károly Gazdasági Kar, Óbudai Egyetem - 2007

Voting power methodology offers insights to understand coalition building in collective decision making. This paper proposes a new measure of voting power inspired from Banzhaf (1965) accounting for the proximity between voters by capturing how often they appear in winning coalitions together....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005764541

Measuring voting power: The paradox of new members vs the null player axiom

Kóczy, László Á. - Keleti Károly Gazdasági Kar, Óbudai Egyetem - 2009

Qualified majority voting is used when decisions are made by voters of different sizes. In such situations the voters' influence on decision making is far from obvious; power measures are used for an indication of the decision making ability. Several power measures have been proposed and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005029653

Convex and Exact Games with Non-transferable Utility

Csóka, Péter; Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Kóczy, … - Keleti Károly Gazdasági Kar, Óbudai Egyetem - 2009

We generalize exactness to games with non-transferable utility (NTU). In an exact game for each coalition there is a … core allocation on the boundary of its payoff set. Convex games with transferable utility are well-known to be exact. We … convex, cardinally convex, coalition merge convex, individual merge convex and marginal convex games to one another. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005029654