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This paper studies the efficiency of collusion between supervisors and supervisees. Building on Tirole (1986)’s results that deterring collusion with infinitely risk averse supervisors is impossible, while it is costless to do so under risk neutrality, we develop here a theory of collusion...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928620
We propose a theory of supervision with endogenous transaction costs. A principal delegates part of his authority to a supervisor who can acquire soft information about an agent's productivity. If the supervisor were risk-neutral, the principal would simply make the better informed supervisor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928775
This paper shows that the inability of regulators to commit to long-term contracts is irrelevant when there is some competition between regulated firms and when firms' private information is correlated. This sharply contrasts with the dynamic of regulation without such competition. The paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010744985
No abstract is available for this paper
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745448
We provide a formal analysis of the notion that conglomerates are more ‘entrenched’ as they have ‘deeper pockets’. Using the financial contracting model of Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), we can isolate two effects that confirm this conjecture: the pooling of cash flows, which allows to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746348
A prevalent feature in rating markets is the possibility for the client to hide the outcome of the rating process, after learning that outcome. This paper identifies the optimal contracting arrangement and the circumstances under which simple ownership contracts over ratings implement this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071353