the latter half of the 1990s. Far from rejecting the optimal incentive contracting theory of executive compensation, the … recent evidence on executive pay can be reconciled with classical agency theory once one expands the framework to allow for …

incentive to induce managers to pursue actions which increase the speculative component in the stock price. Our model provides a …

managers. We question this view within its own analytical framework by studying, in a principal-agent model, the effects of … diversion overlooks a significant cost of such behavior. Many common modes of compensation can provide managers with incentives …

executive officers. However, firms are run by teams of managers, and a theory of the firm should also explain the distribution …

Stock-based compensation is the standard solution to agency problems between shareholders and managers. In a dynamic … managers to work harder, it also induces them to hide any worsening of the firm's investment opportunities by following largely …-valued while managers hide the bad news to shareholders. We find that a firm-specific compensation package based on both stock and …

This paper presents theory and evidence on horizontal industry structure, focusing on situations where plant …

Firms are more complicated than standard principal-agent theory allows: firms have assets-in-place; firms endure … through time, allowing for the possibility of replacing a shirking manager; firms have many managers, constraining the amount …