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On the Role of Group Size in Tournaments : Theory and Evidence from Lab and Field Experiments

List, John - 2014

. We begin with a theoretical exploration of optimal contest design, focusing on the number of competitors. Our theory … test of the theory implements a laboratory experiment, where important features of the theory can be exogenously imposed … models to inform us of the relevant theoretical predictions. In both cases we find that the theory has a fair amount of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012458656

Compensation Matters : Incentives for Multitasking in a Law Firm

Bartel, Ann - 2013

on the task allocation of the firm's team leaders is large and robust; team leaders increase their non-billable hours and … shift billable hours to team members. Although the motivation for the change in the compensation plan was the multitasking … problem, this change also impacted the way tasks were allocated within each team, resulting in greater teamwork …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012459249

Opportunity Counts : Teams and the Effectiveness of Production Incentives

Boning, Brent - 2001

This paper investigates the individual and joint effects of group incentive pay and problem-solving teams on productivity. To estimate models of adoption of these work practices and models of the effects of the work practices on productivity, we constructed a data set on the operations of 34...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012470418

Image Versus Information : Changing Societal Norms and Optimal Privacy

Ali, S. Nageeb - 2016

We analyze the costs and benefits of using social image to foster virtuous behavior. A Principal seeks to motivate reputation-conscious agents to supply a public good. Each agent chooses how much to contribute based on his own mix of public-spiritedness, private signal about the value of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012456472

The Generalized Informativeness Principle

Chaigneau, Pierre - 2014

This paper shows that the informativeness principle, as originally formulated by Holmstrom (1979), does not hold if the first-order approach is invalid. We introduce a "generalized informativeness principle" that takes into account non-local incentive constraints and holds generically, even...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012457937

Social Insurance, Information Revelation, and Lack of Commitment

Golosov, Mikhail - 2014

We study the optimal provision of insurance against unobservable idiosyncratic shocks in a setting in which a benevolent government cannot commit. A continuum of agents and the government play an infinitely repeated game. Actions of the government are constrained only by the threat of reverting...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012458032

The Informativeness Principle Under Limited Liability

Chaigneau, Pierre - 2014

This paper shows that the informativeness principle does not automatically extend to settings with limited liability. Even if a signal is informative about effort, it may have no value for contracting. An agent with limited liability is paid zero for certain output realizations. Thus, even if...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012458212

Testing the Theory of Multitasking : Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment in Chinese Factories

Hong, Fuhai - 2013

tasks that produce unobservable outputs as they seek the salient rewards to observable outputs. Since the theory related to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012459002

Search and Work in Optimal Welfare Programs

Pavoni, Nicola - 2013

Some existing welfare programs ("work-first") require participants to work in exchange for benefits. Others ("job search-first") emphasize private job-search and provide assistance in finding and retaining a durable employment. This paper studies the optimal design of welfare programs when (i)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012459994

Stock-Based Compensation and CEO (Dis)Incentives

Benmelech, Efraim - 2008

Stock-based compensation is the standard solution to agency problems between shareholders and managers. In a dynamic rational expectations equilibrium model with asymmetric information we show that although stock-based compensation causes managers to work harder, it also induces them to hide any...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464915