Economists have been paying increasing attention to the study of situations in which consumers face a discrete rather than a continuous set of choices. Such models are potentially very important in evaluating the impact of government programs upon consumer welfare. But very little has been said...

This paper presents a downtown parking model that integrates traffic congestion and saturated on-street parking. We assume that the stock of cars cruising for parking adds to traffic congestion. Two major results come out from the model, one of which is robust. The robust one is that, whether or...

Consider an atomistic developer who decides when and at what density to develop his land, under a property tax system characterized by three time-invariant tax rates: the tax rate on pre-development land value, the tax rate on post-development residual site value, and the tax rate on structure....

In recent years, a new set of models drawing on Vickrey [1969] has been developed to analyze the economics of congestible facilities. These models are structural in that they derive the cost function from consumers' time-of-use decisions and the congestion technology. Standard models, in...

There are constraints on pricing congestible facilities. First, if heterogeneous users are observationally indistinguishable, then congestion charges must be anonymous. Second, the time variation of congestion charges may be constrained. Do these constraints undermine the feasibility of marginal...

Is an economy with adverse selection, moral hazard, or an incomplete set of risk markets "constrained" Pareto efficient? There are two sets of papers addressing this question, one asserting that, under seemingly quite general conditions, the economy is constrained Pareto efficient, the other (to...

In this paper, we investigate the descriptive and normative properties of competitive equilibrium with moral hazard when firms offer "price contracts" which allow clients to purchase as much insurance as they wish at the quoted prices. We show that a price equilibrium always exists and is one of...

This paper examines the existence and nature of competitive equilibrium with moral hazard. The more insurance an individual has, the less care will he take. Consequently, insurance firms attempt to restrict their clients' aggregate insurance purchases. If individuals' aggregate insurance...

This paper shows that, except in certain limiting cases, competitive equilibrium with moral hazard is constrained inefficient. The first section compares the competitive equilibrium and the constrained social optimum in a fairly general model, and identifies types of market failure. Each of the...