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Bebchuk, Lucian A. - 2007

We investigate the relationship between CEO centrality -- the relative importance of the CEO within the top executive team in terms of ability, contribution, or power -- and the value and behavior of public firms. Our proxy for CEO centrality is the fraction of the top-five compensation captured...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464945

Understanding the Determinants of Managerial Ownership and the Link Between Ownership and Performance

Himmelberg, Charles P. - 2000

Both managerial ownership and performance are endogenously determined by exogenous (and only partly observed) changes in the firm's contracting environment. We extend the cross-sectional results of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and use panel data to show that managerial ownership is explained by key...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471259

Executive Compensation : A Survey of Theory and Evidence

Edmans, Alex - 2017

This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on executive compensation. We start by presenting data on the level of CEO and other top executive pay over time and across firms, the changing composition of pay; and the strength of executive incentives. We compare pay in U.S. public...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012455086

CEO Pay and the rise of Relative Performance Contracts : A Question of Governance?

Bell, Brian - 2016

Would moving to relative performance contracts improve the alignment between CEO pay and performance? To address this we exploit the large rise in relative performance awards and the share of equity pay in the UK over the last two decades. Using new employer-employee matched datasets we find...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012456270

Corporate Governance and Risk Management at Unprotected Banks : National Banks in the 1890s

Calomiris, Charles W. - 2014

Managers' incentives may conflict with those of shareholders or creditors, particularly at leveraged, opaque banks …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012458857

Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in the U.S : Perceptions, Facts and Challenges

Kaplan, Steven N. - 2012

In this paper, I consider the evidence for three common perceptions of U.S. public company CEO pay and corporate governance: (1) CEOs are overpaid and their pay keeps increasing; (2) CEOs are not paid for their performance; and (3) boards do not penalize CEOs for poor performance. While average...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012460264

Does Performance-Based Managerial Compensation Affect Subsequent Corporate Performance?

Abowd, John M. - 1989

An effective performance-based compensation system must increase the probability of high performance corporate outcomes in order to justify the incremental expense relative to a straight salary system. A positive relation between current performance and current compensation indicates that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012475894

Seeking Alpha : Excess Risk Taking and Competition for Managerial Talent

Acharya, Viral V. - 2013

We present a model in which managers are risk-averse and firms compete for scarce managerial talent ("alpha"). When … managers are not mobile across firms, firms provide efficient compensation, which allows for learning about managerial talent … and for insurance of low-quality managers. When instead managers can move across firms, firms cannot offer co …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012459770

CEO Compensation and Cash-Flow Shocks : Evidence from Changes in Environmental Regulations

Choi, Seungho; Levine, Ross; Park, Jonghyeon; Xu, Simon - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2024

This paper investigates how shocks to expected cash flows influence CEO incentive compensation. Exploiting changes in compliance with environmental regulations as shocks to expected future cash flows, we find that adverse shocks typically prompt corporate boards to recalibrate CEO compensation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014486193

Risk Perceptions, Board Networks, and Directors' Monitoring

Ding, Wenzhi; Chen, Lin; Schmid, Thomas; Weisbach, … - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2021

stronger if the observing and penalized directors share the same professional background or gender and if the observing …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012585458

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