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Stock-Based Compensation and CEO (Dis)Incentives
Benmelech, Efraim - 2008
Stock-based compensation is the standard solution to agency problems between shareholders and managers. In a dynamic … managers to work harder, it also induces them to hide any worsening of the firm's investment opportunities by following largely …-valued while managers hide the bad news to shareholders. We find that a firm-specific compensation package based on both stock and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464915
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Q-Monetary Transmission
Jeenas, Priit; Lagos, Ricardo - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2022
develop a theory of the mechanism, provide empirical evidence, evaluate the ability of the quantitative theory to match the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013210051
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A Theory of Income Smoothing When Insiders Know More Than Outsiders
Acharya, Viral V. - 2011
We consider a setting in which insiders have information about income that outside shareholders do not, but property rights ensure that outside shareholders can enforce a fair payout. To avoid intervention, insiders report income consistent with outsiders' expectations based on publicly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012460961
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Organizing for Collective Action : Olson Revisited
Battaglini, Marco; Palfrey, Thomas R. - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2023
We study a standard collective action problem in which successful achievement of a group interest requires costly participation by some fraction of its members. How should we model the internal organization of these groups when there is asymmetric information about the preferences of their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014226188
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Information Favoritism and Scoring Bias in Contests
Deng, Shanglyu; Fang, Hanming; Fu, Qiang; Wu, Zenan - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2023
Two potentially asymmetric players compete for a prize of common value, which is initially unknown, by exerting efforts. A designer has two instruments for contest design. First, she decides whether and how to disclose an informative signal of the prize value to players. Second, she sets the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014247957
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Bayesian Persuasion with Lie Detection
Ederer, Florian; Min, Weicheng - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2022
How does lie detection constrain the potential for one person to persuade another to change her action? We consider a model of Bayesian persuasion in which the Receiver can detect lies with positive probability. We show that the Sender lies more when the lie detection probability increases. As...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013210093
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(Pro-) Social Learning and Strategic Disclosure
Bénabou, Roland; Vellodi, Nikhil - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2024
We study a sequential experimentation model with endogenous feedback. Agents choose between a safe and risky action, the latter generating stochastic rewards. When making this choice, each agent is selfishly motivated (myopic). However, agents can disclose their experiences to a public record,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014544761
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Why Did Putin Invade Ukraine? A Theory of Degenerate Autocracy
Egorov, Georgij V.; Sonin, Konstantin - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2023
incumbent; with higher stakes, the incumbent puts more emphasis on loyalty than competence. Our theory sheds light on the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014250204
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It Hurts To Ask
Bénabou, Roland; Jaroszewicz, Ania; Loewenstein, George F. - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2022
We analyze the offering, asking, and granting of help or other benefits as a three-stage game with bilateral private information between a person in need of help and a potential help-giver. Asking entails the risk of rejection, which can be painful: since unawareness of the need can no longer be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013388842
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Public Information as a Source of Disagreement Among Shareholders
Bouton, Laurent; Llorente-Saguer, Aniol; Macé, Antonin; … - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2022
We study how beliefs about firm value respond to public information stemming from either public announcements or shareholder meetings. We focus on settings with homogeneous shareholders (i.e., agents with common preferences and opinions), where information is about which course of action is best...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013477249