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Over the past few decades, we find that about 80% of the widening residual wage inequality to be within jobs. We propose performance-pay incidence and job relatedness as two primary factors driving within-job inequality and embed them into a sorting equilibrium framework. We show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012481585
We document that an increasing fraction of jobs in the U.S. labor market explicitly pay workers for their performance using bonuses, commissions, or piece-rates. We find that compensation in performance-pay jobs is more closely tied to both observed (by the econometrician) and unobserved...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465526
Does it pay to work? Given the number and complexity of federal and state tax and transfer systems, this is a tough question to answer. The problem is greatly compounded by the fact that what one earns in one year alters not just current taxes and transfer payments in that year, but in future...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012469617
In The Bell Curve, Herrnstein and Murray argue that the U.S. economy is a meritocracy in which differences in wages (including differences across race and gender) are explained by differences in cognitive ability. In this paper we test their claim for wages conditional on occupation using a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012472359
executive officers. However, firms are run by teams of managers, and a theory of the firm should also explain the distribution …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471450
the executive. Agency theory remains the only viable candidate for answering the question about how executive compensation … compensation, in the context of agency theory. We suggest two fertile areas for research regarding the improvement of executive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471670
conform to theory. We survey some literature in this area and suggest areas for further research …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462675
Stock-based compensation is the standard solution to agency problems between shareholders and managers. In a dynamic rational expectations equilibrium model with asymmetric information we show that although stock-based compensation causes managers to work harder, it also induces them to hide any...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464915
This paper examines managerial compensation in an environment where managers may take a hidden action that affects the actual earnings of the firm. When realized, these earnings constitute hidden information that is privately observed by the manager, who may expend resources to generate an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466016
We present a multiperiod agency model of stock based executive compensation in a speculative stock market, where investors are overconfident and stock prices may deviate from underlying fundamentals and include a speculative option component. This component arises from the option to sell the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012468976