Showing 1 - 10 of 23
-added taxation affect the stability of collusive agreements when producers in an international duopoly agree not to export into each …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005487096
With internationally mobile labour and the abolition of national border controls, the individual may not only have private information about his skill level (adverse selection), but also about the length of time he resides and works in the home country (moral hazard) and about his foreign...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005487098
This paper uses a new economic geography model to analyze tax competition between two countries trying to attract internationally mobile capital. Each government may levy a source tax on capital and a lump sum tax on fixed labor. If industry is concentrated in one of the countries, the analysis...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005487099
This paper studies non-cooperative commodity taxation in a trade model with imperfect competition and trade costs …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005487112
In the optimal tax problem, the maximand is quasi-convex in consumer prices. In such a case, there exists no separating hyperplane between the upper contour set of the maximand and the constraint set. Therefore, the second order properties of optimal tax problems are somewhat non-standard...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005781239
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005781259
and international marginal cost of funds and explores the effects of bilateral tax treaties that eliminate double taxation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005646729
Triest (1990) argues that measuring the marginal cost of public funds (MCF) and the marginal excess burden (MEB) requires equivalent variation measures: MCF should be evaluated at consumer prices while MEB requires the use of producer prices. This paper follows up on Triest's argument by showing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005646740
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005646742
Two jurisdictions compete to capture the rents of a large multinational enterprise (MNE) which invests locally and which is partly owned by local investors. The MNE contributes to local welfare by tax payments and dividends and it has private information about the efficiency of the operations in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005646744