Similar Search Results

Employment duration and resistance to wage reductions : experimental evidence

Burda, Michael C.; Güth, Werner; Kirchsteiger, Georg; … - 1998 - Rev.

One of the long-standing puzzles in economics is why wages do not fall sufficiently in recessions so as to avoid increases in unemployment. Put differently, if the competitive market wage declines, why don’t employers simply force their employees to accept lower wages as well? As an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578579

Co-evolution of preferences and information in simple games of trust

Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut; Peleg, Bezalel - 1998

influences rational decision making. An indirect evolutionary analysis of an elementary yet important basic game of trust shows … mixed rest point. However, as opposed to previous studies of preference formation in the game of trust there is no … strategically. -- Evolutionary game models ; Endogenous preference formation ; Trust relationships …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578580

Efficient contracting and fair play in a simple principal-agent experiment

Anderhub, Vital; Gächter, Simon; Königstein, Manfred - 1999

Modern 'principal-agent theory' has made a lot of progress in proposing theoretical Solutions to agency problems. This paper contributes to a better understanding of behavior in agency situations. In particular, we provide experimental evidence on offered contracts and effort choices in a simple...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581090

Learning to bid : an experimental study of bid function adjustments in auctions and fair division games

Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Königstein, … - 1999

We examine learning behavior in auctions and Fair division games with independent private values under two different price rules, first and second price. Participants face these four games repeatedly and submit complete bid functions rather than single bids. This allows us to examine whether...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581102

The false consensus effect disappears if representative information and monetary incentives are given

Engelmann, Dirk; Strobel, Martin - 1999

In this paper we present an experiment on the false consensus effect. Unlike previous experiments, we provide monetary incentives for revealing the actual estimation of others' behavior. In each session and round sixteen subjects make a choice between two options simultaneously. Then they...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581106

Auctions and fair division games under different price rules : individual bid functions, prices and efficiency rates

Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Königstein, … - 1999

In auctions an outside seIler offers a commodity for sale and collects the revenue w hich is achieved. In fair division games the object is owned by the group of bidders. Consequently the auction's revenue is equally distributed among all bidders. In our experiment participants face four auction...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009582405

Bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions : an experimental study

Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Wolfstetter, … - 2001

We review an asymmetric auction experiment. Based on Plum (1992) private valuations of the two bidders are independently drawn from distinct but commonly known distributions, one of which stochastically dominating the other. We test the qualitative properties of that model of asymmetric...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612559

Evolutionary dynamics on infinite strategy spaces

Oechssler, Joerg; Riedel, Frank - 1998

The study of evolutionary dynamics was so far mainly restricted to finite strategy spaces. In this paper we show that this restriction is in most cases unnecessary. We give a mild condition under which the continuous time replicator dynamics are well defined for infinite strategy spaces....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578001

A note on the E-mail game : bounded rationality and induction

Dulleck, Uwe - 1997

In Rubinstein's (1989) E-mail game there exists no Nash equilibrium where players use strategies that condition on the E-mail communication. In this paper I restrict the utilizable information for one player. I show that in contrast to Rubinstein's result, in a payoff dominant Nash equilibrium...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009657893

Trust in the shadow of the courts if judges are no better

Brennan, Geoffrey; Güth, Werner; Kliemt, Hartmut - 1997

courts may themselves crowd out trustworthiness under certain circumstances. -- Trust relationships ; Evolutionary game …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009657895