In this paper we show that the inclusion of unemployment-tenure interaction variates in Mincer wage equations is subject to serious pitfalls. These variates were designed to test whether or not the sensitivity to the business cycle of a worker’s wage varies according to her tenure. We show...

This paper considers a long-term relationship between two agents who both undertake a costly action or investment that together produces a joint benefit. Agents have an opportunity to expropriate some of the joint benefit for their own use. Two cases are considered: (i) where agents are risk...

The paper examines the main issues involved in translating domestic bankruptcy procedures to the sovereign context. It considers some of the principles by which domestic bankruptcy procedures operate, and the extent to which they apply to international lending. Two recent proposals are...

We present an overview of models of long-term self-enforcing labour contracts in which risk sharing is the dominant motive for contractual solutions. A base model is developed which is sufficiently general to encompass the two-agent problem central to most of the literature, including variable...

The paper analyzes the Nash equilibria of two-person discounted repeated games with one-sided incomplete information and known own payo®s. If the informed player is arbitrarily patient relative to the uninformed player, then the characterization for the informed player's payoffs is essentially...

This paper analyses a model of private unemployment insurance under limited commitment and a model of public unemployment insurance subject to moral hazard in an economy with a continuum of agents and an infinite time horizon. The dynamic and steady-state properties of the optimum private...

This paper analyses a model in which .rms cannot pay discriminate based on year of entry to a .rm, and develops an equilibrium model of wage dynamics and unemployment. The model is developed under the assumption of worker mobility, so that workers can costlessly quit jobs at any time. Firms on...

We examine the commitment effect of delegated bargaining when the delegation contract is renegotiable. We consider a seller who can either bargain face-to-face with a prospective buyer or delegate bargaining to an intermediary. The intermediary is able to interrupt negotiating with the buyer to...