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This paper characterizes optimal renegotiation proof public perfect equilibrium in a repeated partnership game. The model was originally introduced by Mobius. Players have random arrival of endowments which are privately observed that are more valued by the partner than the player receiving the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005069463
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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090886
This paper studies repeated moral hazard in teams. Agents' actions are observable to each other but not to the principal. For any given dynamic contract, agents always select their favorite subgame perfect equilibrium in the corresponding dynamic game. The optimal dynamic contract must take that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090913
We study games in which players search for an optimal action profile. All action profiles are either a success, with a payoff of one, or a failure, with a payoff of zero. Players do not know the location of success profiles; instead each player is privately informed about the marginal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051236
Received wisdom maintains that LDCs ought to pursue pro-growth fiscal policy if it is incentive-feasible. We extend a standard model of growth to include imperfect, endogenously determined, property rights, and re-examine the welfare consequences of fiscal policy. Contrary to conventional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051409
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005027218
This paper studies dynamic non-linear taxation in a two-period model without government commitment and a continuum of agents with privately known skill parameters, which are constant overtime. The government is utilitarian but cannot commit at t=1 to the tax scheme that she will propose at t=2....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005085448
In the standard model of dynamic interaction, players are assumed to receive public signals according to some exogenous distributions for free. We deviate from this assumption in two directions to consider an aspect of information structure in a more realistic way. We assume that signals are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005085454
utility will drift downwards to its minimal level. Thus, the ex ante optimal provision of incentives implies severe ex post …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005085465
In this paper, we analyze the problem of store design when consumers have preferences with temptation and self-control, as introduced by Gul and Pesendorfer (2001). We say that a monopolist designs its stores when it chooses the number of stores to open and the quality and price of the goods to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005085470