In the standard model of dynamic interaction, players are assumed to receive public signals according to some exogenous distributions for free. We deviate from this assumption in two directions to consider an aspect of information structure in a more realistic way. We assume that signals are...

In the canonical learning model, the multi-armed bandit with independent arms, a decision maker learns about the different alternatives only through his private experience. It is well known that any optimal experimentation strategy for this problem is ex-post inefficient: it sometimes leads the...

A fundamental non-stationarity of infinitely repeated games as usually studied is that the length of the history of play gets longer each period. With private actions (and mixed strategies) or private signals, this introduces a particular difficulty with common solution concepts such as...

We show that the ways incentives can be provided during dynamic interaction depend very crucially on the manner in which players learn information. This conclusion is established in a general stationary environment with noisy public monitoring and frequent actions. The monitoring process can be...

This paper studies Holmstrom's [1999] seminal model of career concerns, but considers that a small change in the beliefs about the agent's future productivity may imply a large change in his compensation---because, for example, the agent may be fired or promoted. This allows us to study how the...

It is commonly thought that a picture is worth a thousand words. If that is so, one might ask how much data is a piece of advice worth. In other words, if advice is important than we should be able to measure it in two ways: How much data would a rational decision maker be willing to give up in...

We study how the use of judgement or add-factors in macroeconomic forecasting may disturb the set of equilibrium outcomes when agents learn using recursive methods. We isolate conditions under which "exuberance equilibria" exist in standard macroeconomic environments. These equilibria may...