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This paper provides a framework within which to study the equilibrium impact of alternative policies. We develop an overlapping generation, life-cycle model with endogenous education and crime choices. Education and crime depend on different dimensions of heterogeneity, which takes the form of...
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I analyze the implications of moral hazard in dynamic economy with production. In particular, I add agency frictions to a benchmark stochastic growth model, by assuming that firms observe output but hours worked and productivity are unobservable. I cast the problem as a continuous time principal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004977904
This paper studies dynamic non-linear taxation in a two-period model without government commitment and a continuum of agents with privately known skill parameters, which are constant overtime. The government is utilitarian but cannot commit at t=1 to the tax scheme that she will propose at t=2....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005085448
In the standard model of dynamic interaction, players are assumed to receive public signals according to some exogenous distributions for free. We deviate from this assumption in two directions to consider an aspect of information structure in a more realistic way. We assume that signals are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005085454
Social insurance arrangements that are optimal from the perspective of a utilitarian planner confronting a population of privately informed agents frequently exhibit an "immiseration" property - with probability 1 an agent's continuation utility will drift downwards to its minimal level. Thus,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005085465
In this paper, we analyze the problem of store design when consumers have preferences with temptation and self-control, as introduced by Gul and Pesendorfer (2001). We say that a monopolist designs its stores when it chooses the number of stores to open and the quality and price of the goods to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005085470