power of our framework using several large-scale Monte Carlo experiments.

This paper shows that public provision of private goods may be justified on pure efficiency grounds in an environment where individuals consume both public and private goods. The government's involvement in the provision of private goods provides it with information about individuals' private...

the private good improves economic efficiency under a condition that is always fulfilled under stochastic independence and satisfied for an open set of joint distributions. Our model is an example where there is an efficiency loss from separating revenue and expenditure problems, and is...

We analyze a model in which agents endogenously decide whether to locate close to other members of the extended family, as opposed to different cities or states. The agents' decisions are affected by several factors including the nature of the shock process affecting incomes, initial wealth,...

We empirically implement an equilibrium labor market search model where both wages and health insurance provisions are endogenously determined and use it to predict the impact of the 2010 U.S. health insurance reform on health insurance coverage and labor market outcomes. In our model, employers...

timber auctions.

We present an empirical dynamic discrete choice model of life insurance decisions designed to bypass data limitations where researchers only observe whether an individual has made a new life insurance decision but but do not observe the actual policy choice or the choice set from which the...

This paper builds and estimtates a dynamic equilibrium model to study renegotiation between borrowers and lenders over distressed fixed-rate mortage loans using a unqie mortgage loan level data. The model captures borrowers' as well as lenders' behavior prior to borrowers' mortgages becoming...

We consider an environment with asymmetric information about preferences for a public good and a private good. If the public good must be financed from contributions made by participants and if participants must be given incentives to participate in the mechanism, we show that there are...