We study games in which players search for an optimal action profile. All action profiles are either a success, with a payoff of one, or a failure, with a payoff of zero. Players do not know the location of success profiles; instead each player is privately informed about the marginal...

This paper explores the implications of culturally biased testing for the employment decisions of firms. Only the workers know whether they can do the job or not so firms test them. Wages are made contingent on the test results which are public information. The threshold result for hiring...

Shimer (2005) showed that a standard search and matching model of the labor market fails to generate fluctuations of unemployment and vacancies of the magnitude observed in US data in response to shocks to average labor productivity of plausible magnitude. He also suggested that wage...

This paper studies amplification of productivity shocks in labor markets through on-the-job-search. There is incomplete information about the quality of the employee-firm match which provides persistence in employment relationships and the rationale for on-the-job search. Amplification arises...

This paper introduces risk averse workers into a search and matching model and considers the quantitative performance of the model over the business cycle. Wages are determined by long term contracts between workers and firms, with firms providing insurance to workers against variation in labor...