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The false consensus effect disappears if representative information and monetary incentives are given

Engelmann, Dirk; Strobel, Martin - 1999

In this paper we present an experiment on the false consensus effect. Unlike previous experiments, we provide monetary incentives for revealing the actual estimation of others' behavior. In each session and round sixteen subjects make a choice between two options simultaneously. Then they...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581106

Framing effects on asset markets : an experimental analysis

Kirchler, Erich; Maciejovsky, Boris; Weber, Martin - 2001

In this paper we investigate four hypotheses which are inconsistent with expected utility theory, but may well be explained by prospect theory. It deals with framing, the non-linearity of subjective probabilities, the disposition effect, and the correspondence of different experimental risk...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009613618

Employment duration and resistance to wage reductions : experimental evidence

Burda, Michael C.; Güth, Werner; Kirchsteiger, Georg; … - 1998 - Rev.

One of the long-standing puzzles in economics is why wages do not fall sufficiently in recessions so as to avoid increases in unemployment. Put differently, if the competitive market wage declines, why don’t employers simply force their employees to accept lower wages as well? As an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578579

Bidder preferences among auction institutions

Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Salmon, Tim - 2002

This study examines bidder preferences between alternative auction institutions. In particular we seek to experimentally characterize the degree to which bidders prefer an ascending auction over a sealed bid auction. We find very strong ceteris paribus preferences for the ascending institution...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009627275

Comparative study of one-bid versus two-bid auctions

Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Sonsino, Doron - 2001

We compare the standard one-bid first price auction to a corresponding two-bid first price auction where each buyer may place two bids: a high bid and a low one and the winner pays his low bid if this was higher than all other bids. We characterize the equilibria of the two mechanisms and prove...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009615428

Efficient contracting and fair play in a simple principal-agent experiment

Anderhub, Vital; Gächter, Simon; Königstein, Manfred - 1999

Modern 'principal-agent theory' has made a lot of progress in proposing theoretical Solutions to agency problems. This paper contributes to a better understanding of behavior in agency situations. In particular, we provide experimental evidence on offered contracts and effort choices in a simple...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581090

Learning to bid : an experimental study of bid function adjustments in auctions and fair division games

Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Königstein, … - 1999

We examine learning behavior in auctions and Fair division games with independent private values under two different … than single bids. This allows us to examine whether learning is influenced by the structural differences between games. We … find that within the time horizon which we investigate, learning does not drive toward risk neutral equilibrium bidding and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581102

Auctions and fair division games under different price rules : individual bid functions, prices and efficiency rates

Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Königstein, … - 1999

) repeteadly. Due to the strategy method (one bids before learning one's private value) we can investigate the slope and curvature …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009582405

The East End, the West End, and King’s Cross : on clustering in the four-player hotelling game

Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Vriend, Nicolaas J. - 2000

This article investigates whether decision makers intuitively optimize close to the normative prediction in entrepreneurial decision situations where their time must be allocated between a wage job and a newly formed venture. We offer an analytical model based on maximizing expected utility, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583426

Bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions : an experimental study

Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Wolfstetter, … - 2001

We review an asymmetric auction experiment. Based on Plum (1992) private valuations of the two bidders are independently drawn from distinct but commonly known distributions, one of which stochastically dominating the other. We test the qualitative properties of that model of asymmetric...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612559