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The false consensus effect disappears if representative information and monetary incentives are given
Engelmann, Dirk; Strobel, Martin - 1999
In this paper we present an experiment on the false consensus effect. Unlike previous experiments, we provide monetary incentives for revealing the actual estimation of others' behavior. In each session and round sixteen subjects make a choice between two options simultaneously. Then they...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581106
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Experimental "beauty contests" with homogeneous and heterogeneous players and with interior and boundary equilibria
Güth, Werner; Kocher, Martin; Sutter, Matthias - 2001
We study behavior in experimental beauty contests with, first, boundary and interior equilibria, and, second, homogeneous and heterogenous types of players. We find quicker and better convergence to the game-theoretic equilibrium with interior equilibria and homogeneous players. -- beauty...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009614296
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Auctions and corruption
Lengwiler, Yvan; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2000
In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This delegation invites corruption. In this paper we … propose a model of corruption, examine how corruption affects the auction game, how the anticipation of corruption affects … that may prevent corruption, and compare them to the fee schedules employed by major auction houses. -- auctions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583882
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Everyday representations of tax avoidance, tax evasion, and tax flight : do legal differences matter?
Kirchler, Erich; Maciejovsky, Boris; Schneider, Friedrich - 2001
From an economic point of view, legal considerations apart, tax avoidance, tax evasion and tax flight have similar effects, namely a reduction of revenue yields, and are based on the same desire to reduce the tax burden. Due to legal differences and moral concerns it is, however, likely that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009614298
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Employment duration and resistance to wage reductions : experimental evidence
Burda, Michael C.; Güth, Werner; Kirchsteiger, Georg; … - 1998 - Rev.
One of the long-standing puzzles in economics is why wages do not fall sufficiently in recessions so as to avoid increases in unemployment. Put differently, if the competitive market wage declines, why don’t employers simply force their employees to accept lower wages as well? As an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578579
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Bidder preferences among auction institutions
Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Salmon, Tim - 2002
This study examines bidder preferences between alternative auction institutions. In particular we seek to experimentally characterize the degree to which bidders prefer an ascending auction over a sealed bid auction. We find very strong ceteris paribus preferences for the ascending institution...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009627275
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Comparative study of one-bid versus two-bid auctions
Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Sonsino, Doron - 2001
We compare the standard one-bid first price auction to a corresponding two-bid first price auction where each buyer may place two bids: a high bid and a low one and the winner pays his low bid if this was higher than all other bids. We characterize the equilibria of the two mechanisms and prove...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009615428
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Efficient contracting and fair play in a simple principal-agent experiment
Anderhub, Vital; Gächter, Simon; Königstein, Manfred - 1999
Modern 'principal-agent theory' has made a lot of progress in proposing theoretical Solutions to agency problems. This … evidence on offered contracts and effort choices in a simple agency game. In line with principal-agent theory we find that in … design has to regard an equity constraint that has so far been neglected by contract theory. In fact, most contract offers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581090
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Learning to bid : an experimental study of bid function adjustments in auctions and fair division games
Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Königstein, … - 1999
sequencing structure of game types, game rules do matter, and directional learning theory offers a partial explanation for bid …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581102
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Auctions and fair division games under different price rules : individual bid functions, prices and efficiency rates
Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Königstein, … - 1999
In auctions an outside seIler offers a commodity for sale and collects the revenue w hich is achieved. In fair division games the object is owned by the group of bidders. Consequently the auction's revenue is equally distributed among all bidders. In our experiment participants face four auction...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009582405