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Lengwiler, Yvan; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2000

In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This delegation invites corruption. In this paper we … propose a model of corruption, examine how corruption affects the auction game, how the anticipation of corruption affects … that may prevent corruption, and compare them to the fee schedules employed by major auction houses. -- auctions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583882

Everyday representations of tax avoidance, tax evasion, and tax flight : do legal differences matter?

Kirchler, Erich; Maciejovsky, Boris; Schneider, Friedrich - 2001

From an economic point of view, legal considerations apart, tax avoidance, tax evasion and tax flight have similar effects, namely a reduction of revenue yields, and are based on the same desire to reduce the tax burden. Due to legal differences and moral concerns it is, however, likely that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009614298

Bidder preferences among auction institutions

Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Salmon, Tim - 2002

This study examines bidder preferences between alternative auction institutions. In particular we seek to experimentally characterize the degree to which bidders prefer an ascending auction over a sealed bid auction. We find very strong ceteris paribus preferences for the ascending institution...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009627275

Employment duration and resistance to wage reductions : experimental evidence

Burda, Michael C.; Güth, Werner; Kirchsteiger, Georg; … - 1998 - Rev.

One of the long-standing puzzles in economics is why wages do not fall sufficiently in recessions so as to avoid increases in unemployment. Put differently, if the competitive market wage declines, why don’t employers simply force their employees to accept lower wages as well? As an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578579

Efficient contracting and fair play in a simple principal-agent experiment

Anderhub, Vital; Gächter, Simon; Königstein, Manfred - 1999

Modern 'principal-agent theory' has made a lot of progress in proposing theoretical Solutions to agency problems. This … evidence on offered contracts and effort choices in a simple agency game. In line with principal-agent theory we find that in … design has to regard an equity constraint that has so far been neglected by contract theory. In fact, most contract offers …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581090

Learning to bid : an experimental study of bid function adjustments in auctions and fair division games

Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Königstein, … - 1999

sequencing structure of game types, game rules do matter, and directional learning theory offers a partial explanation for bid …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581102

The false consensus effect disappears if representative information and monetary incentives are given

Engelmann, Dirk; Strobel, Martin - 1999

In this paper we present an experiment on the false consensus effect. Unlike previous experiments, we provide monetary incentives for revealing the actual estimation of others' behavior. In each session and round sixteen subjects make a choice between two options simultaneously. Then they...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009581106

Auctions and fair division games under different price rules : individual bid functions, prices and efficiency rates

Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Königstein, … - 1999

In auctions an outside seIler offers a commodity for sale and collects the revenue w hich is achieved. In fair division games the object is owned by the group of bidders. Consequently the auction's revenue is equally distributed among all bidders. In our experiment participants face four auction...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009582405

The East End, the West End, and King’s Cross : on clustering in the four-player hotelling game

Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Vriend, Nicolaas J. - 2000

This article investigates whether decision makers intuitively optimize close to the normative prediction in entrepreneurial decision situations where their time must be allocated between a wage job and a newly formed venture. We offer an analytical model based on maximizing expected utility, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583426

Bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions : an experimental study

Güth, Werner; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Wolfstetter, … - 2001

We review an asymmetric auction experiment. Based on Plum (1992) private valuations of the two bidders are independently drawn from distinct but commonly known distributions, one of which stochastically dominating the other. We test the qualitative properties of that model of asymmetric...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009612559